Decisions and sensemaking in the uncertain environment of oil industry by Zangana, Ranch Aso
 Date:	08.06.2016	 	 	 	 	 Pages:	78	
	
 
Emnekode:	EN310E																																											Name:		Ranch	Aso	Zangana 
	 	 	  
Decisions	and	Sensemaking	in	The	
Uncertain	Environment	of	Oil	Industry		
 
 
 
 
i 
i 
 
Abstract 
 
This master thesis represents the end of a major in Master of Science in Energy Management. 
This thesis discusses what key actors in the context of what tools decision makers in oil 
companies uses in their investment decisions, and how these images are constructed. This 
thesis is based on qualitative approach in form of conversational interviews with three highly 
experienced informants from the petroleum industry. In addition to this, previous reports, 
articles and documents have been used to verify the primary data.  
 
The main result of this study is that oil companies use rational, mathematical models in form 
of NPV, IRR and several others in their investment decisions. However, because of highly 
uncertain and complex environment of the industry, it becomes visible that rational tools do 
not provide a conclusive guide for investment decisions. As a result, decision makers have to 
ultimately rely on their own cognitive skill.  
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            Chapter 1 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The global energy market is experiencing one of the largest transformations in history. The 
unpredicted, rapid price fall of 60 percent between June 2014 and January 2015 was one of 
the largest of its kind during the past 30 years, ending a five- year era of high and stable 
global oil price around $105 dollar per barrel. Although this sudden decline was driven by 
several reasons that imbalanced the global supply-demand marked, the rapid growth on 
unconventional oil in America and OPECs sudden shift in policy is believed to be the major 
factors. Because of the technological innovation of horizontal drilling combined with 
hydraulic fracking, the oil production in US has since 2008 increased by 80 percent, or four 
million barrel per day. At the same time, the country’s oil imports have declined from 60 
percent to 20 percent. This development from the world’s largest oil consumer has directly 
led to today’s oil price collapse (Baffes et el, 2015). One other major factor for this 
development is indeed the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting countries), or 
rather Saudi Arabia’s shifting policy. The Cartel, who has maintained the stability in the 
supply market for over 40 years, now seems suddenly unpredictable. Instead of cutting 
production to balance the market as they usually have done in previous oil price collapse, they 
have rather increased their production from their official quota of 30 million barrel per day to 
nearly 32 million barrel per day(Yager, 2015).  
 
The startling aspect of this recent oil price collapse is that it came out of nowhere. There were 
no “credible” forecast before the collapse that predicted this development. In a Bloomberg 
article in late 2013 named “most accurate oil price forecasts” predicted an oil price of $105 
for the year, illustrating the unpredictability of these forecasts and of the market (Smith, 
2013). One of the lowest forecasts was done by Edward Morse, the head of global commodity 
research, which predicted a price of $75 as plausible (Platts, 2014).  
 
International oil companies, which are closer to the industry and its activities, were also 
wrong as the rest and have suffered greatly for it. There are speculations that one of the major 
factors for our current oil price collapse is due to overinvestments from the oil and gas 
companies during 2013-2014. This overinvestment reached its peak in 2013 when the 
cumulative investment that year was approximately $900 billion in exploration and 
 
 
 
2 
2 
development (Nysveen and Islam, 2015). Most of these investments are considered today as 
highly “risky”, meaning that there are potential for loss. It seems that many oil companies 
have made their investment valuation based upon the assumption that the oil price would 
remain in a triple-digit number for the years to come. As the CEO of Chevron stated, “there is 
a new reality in our business…where $100 p/b is becoming the new $20 p/b” (Platts, 2014). 
 
1.1 Norwegian Perspective 
 
“Norway`s oil industry is in a crisis now, we can`t deny it anymore”, said Bente Nyland, 
director general of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. (Holter, 2016) 
 
Norwegian petroleum industry, which has been a crucial driver for the country’s economic 
growth since the 1970s, has also been affected of the recent oil price collapse. The country, 
which is Western Europe’s biggest oil supplier, has announced major cuts for the second 
straight year. Investments in the Norwegian continental shelf in 2016 are estimated to drop by 
10 percent, to $15 billion, and will gradually fall to $14.4 billion in 2008 (Holter, 2016). 
According to Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, there will not be an upturn in investment 
before 2019. This is a year later than predicted in 2014. Exploration expenditure in the 
country has also declined by 33 percent to $2.7 billion in 2016, with 30 wells drilled 
compared to 56 in previous year. The development is predicted to continue next year, which 
again will lead to mid-term consequences (Holter, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, with an oil price collapse of more than 70 percent since June 2014, over 30,000 
people has been sacked in the industry and more than 200,000 workers are at risk (Wynne, 
2016). Statoil, Norway’s largest company have already been reducing investment to shield 
their profits. Statoil announced that they were cutting capital expenditure by $1 billion, to $16 
billion. The company also announced their strategy for improving efficiency with $1.7 billion 
from 2016 an onwards, and a part of this achievement would be by cutting unnecessary labor. 
They announced that up to 1500 employees and 500 consultants could be sacked during 2016 
(Exarheas, 2015).  
 
Statoil has been much criticized by the public for their investment decisions during these 
recent years. It is especially their foreign investment in North America that have received 
attention in the media. Many experts believe that the company’s investment decisions 
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regarding this region has been poor and more planning and exploration was needed before 
these major decisions should have been made. The company has simply been willing to pay 
more for these projects than they were originally worth (Storeng, 2015).    
 
1.2 Dilemma and contribution 
There is an obvious dilemma in this context. Oil companies operate in a highly unpredictable 
and volatile environment where the price of oil constantly changing because of global events. 
Because of this, project investment decisions, which are typically long-term and counts for 
billions of NOK, becomes complex and uncertain. Any tools to make investment decision 
within this industry needs to take into account these factors. To determine investment 
decisions, oil companies today typically use rational tools in form of various financial 
analysis. Decision makers inside companies are expected to act rationally based on the 
financial feedbacks they receive from these tools. However, considering the uncertain 
industry environment and companies’ limited available information about future events, it is 
easy to recognize the limitation of these tools as a basis of investment decisions. This 
naturally creates a challenge of how investment decisions are achieved in an uncertain 
environment such as in oil industry.  
 
This study will cast a glimpse of how phenomena “management of uncertainty” are 
constructed by interacting with several informants and examine how they construct an image 
of this phenomenon. The phenomena are naturally not objective, but rather constructed by the 
subjective awareness and understanding. This study will give a perspective of how decisions 
inside companies in uncertain environment actually are realized. 
 
1.3 Purpose  
What becomes relevant in the context of uncertainty and complexity of the oil industry, is 
how informants are realizing investment decisions. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to 
explore investment decisions during management of uncertainty, and how images are 
constructed to give meaning and realize this phenomenon. To be able to explore my 
phenomena, the following statement will be foundation of my thesis: 
 
“What tools are used for investment decisions and how does decision makers make sense of 
investment during uncertainty?” 
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1.4 Structure 
 
This thesis will follow the basic formal requirement, and begins by presenting the theoretical 
frameworks for this thesis. I will first examine how risk and uncertainty are being viewed in 
the academic and practical world, and then present the rational choice theory with some 
investment valuation tools that are being used by most oil companies today. Further, I will 
look at the relevance of sensemaking in an uncertain environment.  
 
Chapter three present the methodology in this thesis. I begin by presenting my philosophical 
approach, thus social constructionism. Then presenting qualitative process of gathering and 
analyzing my findings. Further, I will explain the process of analyzing findings. Finally, I will 
present the level of validity and reliability of findings.  
 
I have in chapter four first presented the context of the uncertainty in the oil industry 
environment, and then presenting my empirical findings gathered from informants. I will give 
an overview of how informants construct images of the way investment decisions are 
achieved inside oil companies. Chapter five will present analysis where I discuss my 
empirical findings with theoretical framework, and finally come up with few concluding 
remarks.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
5 
Chapter 2 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will present a literature review of the relevant theoretical approaches of the 
topics’ rational choice theory and Sensemaking theory. I will provide an overview of how 
contributors have defined the theories that are mentioned in this paper. I begin to examine 
how risk and uncertainty are described in the decision-making literature by academics and 
organizations. I will thereby refer to rational choice theory and few assumptions and the 
principle of this approach. Further, I will review how decision making and sensemaking are 
related to each other.  
 
2.2 Complexity and uncertainty in decision 
Selecting alternative capital investment opportunities is one of the most difficult decisions a 
company has to make. Decision maker often have to choose to invest a large amount of 
money today in the hope of making a profit in the future. Oil companies often have to invest 
in exploration in order to make future long-term profits. Further, because of the complexity 
and uncertainty of each project, decision-makers will eventually make some mistakes along 
the way (Macmillan and Hons, 2000).  
 
For each time a decision maker attempt to make a decision, there will be some sort of 
complexity linked to it. This complexity typically occur when decision-makers have several 
decision alternatives to choose from, and each has quite different consequences. In the case of 
the oil industry, a CEO could, for example, have the options of further appraising a well, 
focusing more on seismic examination, or starting with the actual exploration drilling. 
Uncertainty is certainly indeed in all sorts of decision-making. However, uncertainty normally 
tends to have a positive correlation with the consequence of decisions. This indicates that the 
higher the risk, the higher the uncertainty is (Macmillan and Hons, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, one of the major reasons for many managers’ failures in decision-making today 
is that they are attempting to solve, or rather fulfill several of their organizational goals with a 
single decision. This typically increases risk in most cases. Taking this into account, it is 
perhaps not that surprising that there is only a ten percent chance of major success in the 
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entrepreneur business, and the same applies to the oil drilling industry (Macmillan and Hons, 
2000). 
 
2.2.1 Risk and uncertainty  
Risk and uncertainty are two factors that have always been a hot topic among scholars and 
others. Managers and other decision makers do still disagree at some level on exactly how to 
handle risk and uncertainty in a business environment. Some take an analytical approach 
while others show initiative in their thinking. To tackle this topic, I will first look at how 
investment decision makers interpret risk and uncertainty. Second, I will look at how 
decision-makers deal with this risk and uncertainty.  
 
It is clear that risk and uncertainty exist in all kinds of investment decision-making. This 
assumption is well-deserved. If we absorb a realistic environment in an organization, risk and 
uncertainty represent a big part of the effective capital investment decision making 
(Macmillan and Hons, 2000).   
 
There is evidence that the amount of risk and uncertainty adopted by the decision maker could 
affect the type of method he or she selects. It has also been proven that decision maker that 
explores different types of risk and uncertainty responds differently. However, there is 
unfortunately not enough compelling evidence today to conclude one way or the other 
(Macmillan and Hons, 2000). Furthermore, the decision-making literature does not provide us 
with a clear definition of risk and uncertainty. As Argote (1982) argues that “There are almost 
as many definitions of risk and uncertainty as there are treatments on this subject.” Yates 
(1992) also suggest that “If we were to read ten different articles or books about risks, we 
should not be surprised to see risks described in ten different ways.” 
 
The table below illustrates how different authors in decision literature define risk and 
uncertainty. It clearly shows that there is are no clear definition of what exactly risk and 
uncertainty in the decision-making literature are. However, it does show that risk and 
uncertainty are indeed inherent with one another.  
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Figure 1.  Conceptualization of risk and uncertainty (Lipshitz and Strauss,1997) 
According to Lipshitz and Strauss (1997), uncertainty in the context of decision making will, 
in most cases prevent or delay decision. This statement highlights three fundamental features 
about decisions: (1) it is subjective, which means that different individuals could have 
different opinions in similar or identical situations, (2) no specific form of doubt is stated, and 
(3) it sees uncertainty as a form of its consequence on a decision.  
 
Furthermore, there are also arguments that uncertainty often occur when routines are stopped 
because of certain doubts and uncertainties, while others argue that uncertainty takes place 
when there is competition amongst the alternatives the decision-maker has to choose from 
(Lipshitz and Strauss,1997). Feldman and March (1981) states further that the relationship 
between risk and uncertainty has drawn two contracting decision making models. On one side 
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we have consequential action that requires the decision-maker to look at their alternatives 
thoroughly, and at the consequences of these alternatives in order to make the best decision 
with “best” consequences for the organization. On the other side, we have obligatory action 
that requires quite different thinking. Here, the decision-maker has to study themselves and 
their surrounding environment and ask, “What is the most appropriate decision for me to 
take?” It is important to mention that in both models, coping with uncertainty are the most 
important aspects (Feldman and March, 1981).  
 
As mentioned above, Feldman and March (1981) formulated the relationship between 
uncertainty and decision-making and between consequential and obligatory action. Since 
consequential action requires information about the alternatives and their possible outcomes, 
implementing this model will naturally create doubts regarding various alternatives. 
Implementing obligatory action, however, has other types of issues. This model require that 
the decision maker collects information and knowledge from the situation and also decides 
what he or she should do in that particular situation (Lipshitz and Strauss 1997). 
 
The most common factors in decision literature regarding risk and uncertainty are, (a) lack of 
information and other kinds of data (Thompson, 1967; Grandori, 1984; Smithson, 2008). (b) 
decision-makers could sometimes be indecisive regardless of the information because of the 
diverse opinions of others surrounding them, and, (c) that lack of information and incomplete 
understanding is not necessary the source of uncertainty. Decision-makers could have 
difficulty taking action regardless of whether they have perfectly understood the situation, 
but, however, are undifferentiated, for example, because of equally good or bad decision 
alternatives (March and Simon, cited in Macmillan and Homs, 2000).  
 
2.3. Rational theory approach 
The rational choice theory, also known as the choice theory or the rational action theory, is a 
theory which incorporates understanding and making a “rational choice” based on the fact 
that one has several options. According to Becker (1976), this theory was first acknowledged 
and developed by Gary Becker, the winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
Science. Elster (1989) later explained the basis of rational choice theory by stating that when 
people are faced with several options, they will most likely choose the option which they 
believe will give the best outcome. (Friedman, 1953) explains this further and states that the 
definition of rationality in this theory is that an individual considers his potential profit  
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compared to costs and reach a conclusion that maximizes personal gain. By this definition, an 
individual, or actor, knows the consequences of each potential option.  
 
From an economic perspective, one should know the consequences of each potential option 
and understand the “probabilities” of its occurrence. It is expected that one will choose the 
option that give best-expected outcome. Furthermore, if an action alternative has several 
potential consequences, one must then sum the value of all the consequences and choose the 
consequence with the best utility value (Ogu, 2013). 
 
Rational choice theory begins from the individual standpoint, meaning that although there are 
several assumptions regarding the individual and groups, individual interest is always the 
basis of the theory. This statement implies that ultimately, it is the individuals that make the 
final decision, and that they are mainly committed to their own interests. The theory has some 
assumption about individuals and their interaction with one another. It also creates processes 
that explain complexity regarding operation in collective society that I will present in later 
sections (Ogu, 2013).  
 
Assumption of the rational choice theory 
There are several assumptions regarding this theory. I have presented below few of the most 
fundamental assumptions created by Abell (cited in Ogu, 2013). 
• Individuals. Individuals make the final decision. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
individuals will always act rationally, be self-calculating and self-maximizing. 
Decisions originate from these three elements. From this overall assumption, four 
other assumptions emerge which will be explained below.  
• Optimality. Individuals always attempt to optimize their performance. Optimality 
takes place when other potential alternatives are not preferred by the rational 
individual. However, this decision does not necessarily mean that the preferred action 
is the right one, rather that individuals make the best decision based on the 
surrounding circumstances. 
• Structures. It is argued that the range of choice in situations with multiple courses of 
action differs from courses with a single action. Although this assumption could be 
interpreted as damaging to the theory, it is believed that individuals will eventually 
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find a way to optimize action. This means that rational choice theory may in some 
cases be inflicting and not achieve consensus and harmony in action.  
• Self-regarding interest. An individual’s action will always be based on his or her self- 
interest. This assumption is quite important. However, according to Abell (cited in 
Ogu, 2013), it is not as essential as action optimization. This is because of the biases 
that could occur, such as unselfishness, charity, and participation in activities that does 
not contribute to optimization. However, there are some claims that rationality could 
nevertheless be achieved in this situation, by suggesting that these activities that could 
be interpreted as “unselfish”, could nevertheless ultimately be a tool of some form of 
self- interest. In other words, the intention behind this unselfish act would be to feel 
good about yourself  and perhaps to raise you social position.  
• Rationality. Although this comes last, this is the most essential assumption in the 
theory. All individuals will act according to what they believe to be most beneficial 
for them, and therefore will choose the option according to this.  
 
Steps in the rational choice process  
Green (2002) has developed various steps in his so-called rational choice process, which he 
believes every decision should follow in order to be characterized as “rational”. These are as 
following: 
1. Define the problem and make assumption about their purposes. 
2. Identify the weaknesses and restraints associated with each option.  
3. Determine how you proceed and create a decision process that describes the outcomes 
of every possible alternative.  
4. Analyze how the decision rules of several agents may be made in consistency with one 
another, thereby influencing the equilibrium of the model. These type of analyses 
typically involve mathematical methods. 
5. Analyze how the equilibrium adjusts when changes happen in the surrounding 
environment.  This could be quite complex and require substantial use of advanced 
mathematics. 
6. See if the indications step five gives are consistent with real experiences.  
7. Come to a conclusion.  
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Rational choice and collective action 
Although individuals in rational choice theory are characterized as “rational”, “self-
calculating”, “self-interested”, and “self-maximizing”, it is still possible for them to 
participate in collective decisions or be motivated for common good. According to Olson 
(1965), there are three types of circumstances where an individual could exist in a group: 
• Privileged groups. Members of these groups have an incentive to see that that the best 
collective result is achieved, even if they have to take all the responsibility. It is 
assumed that collective good will be achieved, and members will most likely benefit 
more from collective maximizing good than they would have by acting alone. 
• Latent groups. These are characterized by the fact that a member’s action or 
performance in the group does not have any significant influence on other members. 
Furthermore, because other members do acknowledge or react to their performance, 
they have to reason to “commit to the cause”. This is also called “free-riding”. 
• Intermediate groups. A group where no single member has the incentive to provide the 
good themselves but does have enough members to “hide among the crowd.” In such 
groups, a collective good may, or may not be obtained. Collective good cannot be 
achieved without some guidelines. 
 
Weaknesses 
Rational theory has received much criticism in recent years. Researchers have identified 
several assumptions in this approach that appear to contradict reality in many situations. Ogu 
(2013) mentions in his article few of the most important weaknesses:  
• Challenges when organizations face uncertainty and have limited information 
regarding the current event. This could potentially cause difficulties in making a 
rational decision for individuals. Consequently, the individual may find other 
reasoning solutions when making decisions. 
• People’s social interaction is quite complex and there may be other theoretical 
approaches that could give a better explanation of the process of decision-making. 
• People’s action is often guided by their norms and actions. Once these take root, it 
may influence decisions by not questioning actions, but rather using them to seek 
social action.  
• One of the most questionable assumptions of this approach is that every action people 
make is considered as rational, even in the case of self-sacrifice. In other words, all 
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forms of choices are included as rational in the model, including non-rational choices. 
It is therefore according to this theory not difficult to determine whether a choice is 
rational or not.  
  
2.4 Investment valuation methods 
2.4.1 Net present Value 
Net present value (NPV) is the most common valuation method for investment projects inside 
companies, also oil and gas industry. This method presents several strengths, among others 
that oil projects are treated on equal basis and based on the same criteria as every other 
projects, meaning that one always end up with the best result regardless of what risk 
preferences from shareholders. The calculation and process of the method are very logical and 
gives an easy way to understand potential investment outcomes (Aasen, 2006).  
 
An assumption of great importance in the model is that there is an overreaching goal or vision 
to maximize company’s profit for interest group (shareholders, investors, partners). Based on 
this assumption, the companies want to invest in projects that are worth more than costs. In 
other words, if the value between the present value and costs are greater than zero, there will 
be an incentive for investment. However, if the difference were negative, then the company 
would naturally not invest (Ngo, 2012). The following formula present this connection:  
 
Every investment project is as stated implemented if the net present value is higher than zero. 
 
Where I is the investment cost t=o, r is project rate of return, Kt is cash flow at time t, and n is 
project lifetime.  
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The method starts by estimating revenue and costs (in the cash flow) that will be generated 
during the project timeline. After this, one calculates the hurdle rate for the potential project, 
or cost of capital), which will again reflect the risk linked to the project and the opportunity 
cost. In case of high risk, this hurdle rate will naturally be higher. In the same way, in case of 
low-risk project, hurdle rate will be relatively lower (Ngo, 2012).  
 
In many situations, it is more suitable to have the discount rate reflect the alternative cost of 
capital that is being invested. Most oil and gas companies today that use the net present value 
normally have a discount rate between 9-15 percent. However, there are also cases where 
higher discount rate is adopted to quantify risk and uncertainty. This method assumes that if 
the focus is exclusively on the cash flow, the picture of the profitability would naturally be 
more correct. Hence, one would be better to make investment decisions. These positive 
assumptions are enough reasons to make discounted cash flow among the most adopted 
method (Newendorp and Schuyler, 2000).  
 
Despite these positive characteristics, there are also few weaknesses in the model that are not 
consistence with reality. One of them being the assumption that one have to make the 
assumption of implementing the investment project today, while one have other alternatives 
in reality. One other weakness is the assumption that we know every known input value, 
while in reality, this is not necessary the case (Aasen, 2006)  
 
2.4.2 Internal rate of return 
Internal rate of return (IRR) calculates the discounted rate where the present value of expected 
cash flow of a certain project is equal to the cash flows from a project. In other words, if the 
internal rate that gives NPV is equal to zero. The assumption is that one would accept the 
investment project that has a cost less than the projects rate of return (Ngo, 2012).  
 
This method is very similar to the NPV as a analytical tool for investment projects. It is also 
based on the discounted cash flows, which again provides a measure of the projects 
profitability, given the data input used is accurate. However, the difference in this method is 
that you put the present value equal to zero, and solve the equation with regards to cost of 
capital. The basis of this method is thus to compare the project capital cost and the internal 
rate of return one calculated with (Ngo, 2012).  
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2.4.3 Other investment appraisal techniques 
Other important techniques that petroleum companies currently use today are reviewed below 
(Arora, 2012). As we can see, there have not necessarily been significant changes in 
techniques during the recent past. Companies still mainly apply sophisticated techniques in 
their decision-making.   
• Payback Period. This is defined as the period of time to recover the cost of 
investment, meaning when net revenue is equal to initial investment. This is as 
mentioned often between 9 and 15 years in the oil industry. Most oil companies 
normally prefer the payback period to be less than 5 years, but they will extend this in 
the case of long-term projects. In some cases, decision-makers are not interested in 
finding discounted cash flows when appraising investments, but rather want to know 
how long it will take until they start making a profit.  
• Discounted Cash flow. This is a valuation method used to appraise the attractiveness 
of an investment. The method involves discounting all known future cash flows at an 
appropriate discount rate to find a present value of the involved asset. This present 
value will become the value of the asset. The discounted rate represents a nominal rate 
of return that has to take into account the inflation rate expectations in the market and 
the interest is estimated on the basis of the risk. In the case of unknown future cash 
flows, which occurs often, the method offers two discounted values: (1) estimated 
short-term cash flow, and (2) a (rest) value that represents the value of the project after 
the first period. There are several reasons for this. Discounting puts most of the weight 
and focus on the first cash flows, it is therefore, critical to have accurate estimates 
here. Also, it is easier to estimate short-term cash flows, while there are greater 
uncertainties after each passing year.  
 
• Sensitivity analysis. This is used to predict how an independent variable will impact on 
a certain dependent variable under some presumptions. According to Newadorp (cited 
in Arora, 2012), companies that adopt NPV (Net Present Value) as their key profit 
indicator do this in combination with sensitivity analysis. Once the NPV for a certain 
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investment has been made, the sensitivity analysis is applied to see whether the 
investment would change given the variation in the analysis.  
 
• Decision Tree Analysis and Expected Monetary Value (EMV). This is the expected 
total weighted payouts linked to a decision. It combines estimated income with 
uncertainty in decision principles. The model encourages the decision-maker to accept 
the decision alternative that maximizes the EMV, given that all other factors are equal. 
According to Newendrop, (cited by Arora, 2012), the typical approach to illustrate 
EMV is by using a decision tree. This way, the decision-maker will be able to consider 
the all the angles before taking a course of action.  
 
• Portfolio Theory. Investment portfolio theories aim to guide the decision-maker 
(investor) to allocate financial resources (capital assets) in an investment portfolio. 
This approach has a long-term goal but is independent of the daily market. By doing 
this, it aims to give investors a tool to predict the risk and uncertainty associated with 
investment. This approach is commonly used in the financial markets. Projects are 
preferred based on quantitative information on their input to companies’ long-term 
goals, and also how they affect other projects in the portfolio.  
 
Real option theory 
Real option theory is one of the most favored techniques in the decision analysis approach 
that has received significant attention in the recent years for investment decision-making, 
especially in foreign investments in the petroleum industry (Fan and Zhu, 2010; Henriques 
and Sadorsky, 2011;). This theory has been developed to highlight how oil companies can 
evaluate and compare decisions when considering investing in uncertain situations. 
 
According to Fan and Zhu (2010), the first authors who introduced real option theory to 
investment decision-making literature were Myers and Tumbull (1977). In this analysis 
technique, decision-makers use marked hypotheses together with portfolio theory and trading 
strategies to foresee the financial future outcome, such as future cash flow (using the known 
information). Furthermore, this theory is used to understand the relationship between 
investment risk and uncertainty. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) suggest that in an environment 
with high uncertainty, the option of waiting comes more relevant, given that decisions are 
irreversible. Companies should perhaps not only act (invest) based on whether NPV (net 
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present value) is favorable or not. Hence, the option of waiting increases as uncertainty 
increases. The theory also argues that breaking large investments into a series of smaller 
decisions would reduce risks significantly.  
 
Myers (1984) states that there are some weaknesses in traditional cash flow techniques in 
appraising investment decisions in an environment with high flexibility at managerial level. 
He also states that discounted cash flow analysis could fail as a strategic function, even if it is 
implemented properly. Therefore, managers often want to use an option approach to evaluate 
their investments. Some years later, Paddock et al. (1988 cited by Fan and Zhu, 2010) 
developed a real option model to find the optimal investment value for undeveloped offshore 
oil reserves. They discovered that there are three key advantages of using real option theory 
instead of cash flow method. First, it requires less data to function properly, which means 
fewer computation costs and less likelihood of error. Second, it provides an indication of the 
optimal timing for investing, and third, it provides a guideline for the optimal timing of 
investment. He believes that these are compelling enough reasons to use this approach for 
investment decisions.  
 
However, the assumption of the negative relationship between uncertainties and investment 
has received some critique during later years. Sarkar (2000) states that the traditional option 
structure leaves some questions unanswered. In his studies, he illustrates that in certain 
situations, an increase in uncertainty could, on the contrary, increase the probability of 
investing when the value of possible success is significant.  
 
Alternative theories  
Previous research gives important awareness of the process of decision-making. The current 
theory, however, will give more attention to the rationality and decision-making at corporate 
level and to the more cognitive sensemaking behind decisions. Using this method will lead us 
towards finding the actual reasons for certain decisions in oil companies.    
 
The purpose of this thesis is to build a new understanding of the various processes that are 
involved in decision-making, and the cognitive influence of the top management that are 
affecting the investment decisions. In this regard, I consider the Sensemaking theory to be an 
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appropriate approach, as it reveals how actors resolve problems during crisis in order to make 
logical sense by conserving a sense of coherence and consensus in the decision process.  
 
2.5 The sensemaking theory 
The sensemaking theory assumes that actors are experiencing a continuous stream of 
intangible situations with a high level of complexity and uniqueness (Weick 1995).  The 
theory assumes that when different actors sense that an event will have some sort of 
consequence for the company, they will naturally ask themselves “what is the story here?”  
Furthermore, the actor will then try to solve the issue and bring some meaning to the situation 
by asking the question “now what should I do?” By doing this, actor will then build up 
meaning of what they have sensed in their environment (Obstfeld, cited in Doornich, 2014). 
Arthur (cited in Ancona 2012) further explains the process sensemaking by illustrating with 
an example from casino gambling. 
“How much do you play” you ask                                                                            
“three billion”, the croupier replies                                                                          
“who will be playing” you ask                                                                                    
“We won`t know until they show up”, he replies                                                                     
“what are the rules”,                                                                                              
“These will emerge as the game unfolds”, says the croupier.                                        
“what are the odds of winning?” you say                                                                     
“We can`t say”, he says,                                                                                              
”Do you still want to play?” 
 
Sensemaking refers to the various phases or processes of understanding and meaning where 
individuals and teams try to reflect on different “realities” of events and create different 
subjective accounts (Weick, cited in Brown 2000). It is believed that social world is enacted 
by sensemaking, which has led to the creation of an organizational environment (Berger and 
Luckman, 1991). Sensemaking is the basis that creates the spoken explanation of our 
surroundings, and a feeling of “sense” appears when individuals act as if they share meanings 
with each other, and as a result, reach a consensus (Emerson, 1981). However, this illusion of 
sensemaking tends to exist even when an agreement is not fully achieved, meaning that the 
standpoints of some individuals within teams are neglected. This is because individuals often 
prefer to think that they share common viewpoints even if this is not the case (Gephart et al, 
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1990). Furthermore, given that companies are often hierarchical, individuals have different 
positions and responsibilities, some individuals are able to influence decisions more than 
others are. In other words, some individuals have more voice and authority in the company 
than others, so it is perhaps more appropriate in certain situations to describe sensemaking in 
organizations as a power effect rather than a tool for common sense and consensus (Brown, 
2000).  
 
2.5.1 How does it work? 
Sensemaking is considered useful in several ways. Weick (1995) explains this by associating 
sensemaking with “mapping” ones environment. Creating a map could provide hope of 
awareness and courage to take action in an unexplored and unknown environment. 
Furthermore, in case of teams, constructing a common map of “what is going on?” will also 
most likely guide them to take action. In an uncertain environment where individuals often 
are distressed and concerned about their actions, this process of mapmaking is essential to the 
sensemaking approach (Ancona, 2012).  
 
As we attempt to study and “map” the unknown, we will be able to communicate and explain 
our current situation, come up with various explanation of our circumstance and eventually 
achieve a cognitive consensus and take action. Furthermore, as we explore our environment, 
we will gradually be able to abandon old map and develop a new that are more suitable to our 
understanding of reality (Ancona, 1012).  
 
However, as Weick (1995) points out, it is important to understand that sensemaking is not 
concerned with finding “the correct map” or “correct answer”, but rather to try to create a 
common picture through available data, interpretation and communication. The purpose of 
sensemaking is to be able to take action when your surroundings have shifted. In other words, 
finding courage to act when the future is unclear.  
 
The process of sensemaking in practice can be illustrated through a well-known story by 
Holub (1977, cited in Ancona 2012). According to the story, a unit of soldiers were deployed 
in the Swiss Alps for training. None of the soldiers inside the unit were familiar with the 
areas. Suddenly, one day during training a hard storm started out and it began to snow for 
several days and nights. Because of the clouds and blowing snow, it was very difficult to see 
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the road back to the camp, and at some point, the soldiers began to accept that they were lost. 
Realizing their situation and the possibility of different outcomes of this situation, panic and 
anxiousness started to spread amongst them. No one knew what to do. Suddenly, one soldier 
reached to his pocket and found a map that seemed to be of the area. They all started quickly 
to see and interpret the map together to figure out their location, and how they could get out. 
Together, they began eventually to plot a route home to their base. 
  
They survived the storm and began to take action based on this old map. None of the soldiers 
was sure if the planned route was correct during the way back, so there were still some 
interpretation and sensemaking to be made along the way. There were some villagers in their 
path in one poinet that told them they were moving in the wrong direction and guided them 
the right path. Finally, as they came back to the camp, they realized they the map they have 
been using along the way to guide them, had been a map of another area. The moral of this 
story is, as Weick (1995) puts is, “when you are tired, cold, hungry and scared, any old map 
will do” 
 
According to Ancona (2012), there are several reasons for why any map is considered 
applicable, or at least helpful during uncertainty. Firstly, a poor map could encourage act from 
leaders and other decision makers to reach their goals and ambition that otherwise could not 
have been possible if their perception of the situation were more objective and accurate. There 
are situations where accuracy would be harmful for decision making. In fact, the idea of 
accuracy constructs an image of the world where actions are constant and always predictable, 
instead of organizations with changing context. Secondly, any map that are able to harmonize 
and create activity are more critical than to pursue for accuracy that is not possible to achieve 
anyway. Finally, in a volatile environment, action can be better than accuracy (Ancona, 
2012).  
 
In brief, Weick (1995) believes that because of these arguments and more, plausibility are 
more suitable than accuracy in the process of sensemaking. Creating stories and mapping that 
could lead to explanation, discussion and action are more appealing than approaches that 
focus on getting best possible picture in a constantly changing reality.  
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2.5.2 What hinder sensemaking? 
Because of the importance of sensemaking in organization that operates in uncertain and 
complex environment, there is still a phenomenon why this approach is not done properly, if 
done at all. According to Ancona (2012), the answer may be found in that sensemaking is 
typically desired in time of changing events that cause instant uncertainty. In these situations, 
the very instrument that is used to manage the event could disrupt sensemaking. In time of 
crisis and uncertainty, people are typically unsecure and vulnerable and wish for a clear 
direction and instructions. Therefore, it is most possible that they may go back to old habits 
and old maps, thus rely on old information.  
 
Staw et al (cited in Ancona, 2012) was one of the first researchers that illustrated in their book 
how fear and threat can lead to rigidity. In case of threats, actors typically attempt to limit 
external factors that could affect their operation and decisions. Thus, they try to protect and 
maintain their status quo in the organization. This behavior is also described as the “deer in 
the headlight” syndrome. When a deer face car headlights in the middle of the road at night, 
they normally open their eyes widely go in such a state of shock that loose the ability to react 
in any way. Further, many organizations also sees threat as the time to remove outsiders that 
could “disrupt” their thinking process, and get back to old course of action. In other words, 
they want to go back to their “natural habitat”. However, as mentioned, it is in these situations 
sensemaking are critically needed (Ancona, 2012). 
 
2.5.3 Crisis management 
Crisis management occurs when an organization attempts to control, mitigate, prevent or 
resolve a crisis.  One important part of this concept is to study various aspects of crisis and 
their occurrences. By this definition, crisis management means attempting to pre-plan a crisis 
(Gephart et al, 1990). 
 
Mitroff (2005), identifies seven steps that he believes show the importance of inquiry 
sensemaking for organizations to overcome crisis. First, it is important before an inquiry 
performance to show an emotional picture of the crisis. Attending an inquiry will perhaps 
motivate and encourage managers in preparation for a crisis. Second, it is important to think 
critically when taking part in an inquiry. Conflicting facts will be presented that need to be 
challenged. This could, for example, be through interrogation. Asking as many relevant 
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questions as possible until one is satisfies with information. Third, it is important to use social 
and political skills in inquiries. By reviewing the relevant documents, managers are able to 
gain more knowledge on the social and political skills needed for managing crisis. Fourth, one 
must expect a high level of complexity and uncertainty in every event of crisis. There is 
potential for the learning about different aspects of crisis through inquiries. Fifth, inquiry 
testimony will often expose denial and disapproval among different actors within 
organizations, and also the consequences of this brings. This can be explained and clarified by 
the critical thinking of this process. Sixth, the need to modernize the organization in order to 
overcome the perception that certain parts of the organization can be changed without this 
affecting the organization as a whole. Finally, there is the importance of using the spiritual, 
qualitative way of life to build new meanings and goals after crisis (Mitroff, 2005). 
 
2.5.4 Public inquiry 
Public inquiry is defined as hearings conducted by governments or organizations to assess the 
information presented. The purpose of this ceremonial face-to-face occasion is to investigate 
the causes and consequences of certain events that have impacted the organization. This 
method is typically used in time of uncertainty. Participants in public inquiries will seek to 
understand the important elements of certain events (Gephart, 1992).  
 
Narrative 
The most common way of understanding sensemaking is perhaps by thinking of the 
phenomenon as a narrative analysis, meaning that people act as story-telling individuals, 
where actors can interact and interpret details of experience. This is believed to be one of the 
key ways for actors to express themselves and give voice to their opinions (Riessman, cited in 
Gephart 1992).  
 
Previous narrative public inquiry studies have focused greatly on people’s narratives and 
understanding their way of story-telling in time of uncertain events. Narrative approach argue 
that actors typically focus on certain features of an event and downplaying other features that 
does not suit them. Thus, this process explores the substance of actors’ stories and shows how 
stories are formed and the cultural elements that are used. Narrative analysis explains how 
individuals and organizations make sense of experience by attempting to interpret information 
and create meaning (Barry and Elmes, 1997).  
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Bruner (cited by Brown 2000) argues that the narrative approach helps us to find coherence 
and sufficiency. Narratives are often described as a tool to make sense of events, and to 
predict future potential organizational behavior by using own experiences and interpretation. 
By having this state of mind, people are able to “expect the unexpected”, which again enables 
us to understand, predict, and perhaps control unexpected events in our environment (Wilkins 
and Thompson, 1991) 
 
Rhetorical analysis 
Rhetorical analysis is the art of communication. In other words, how people speak and 
understand (McCloskey, 1998). Rhetorical analysis highlights how stories are able to 
influence audiences’ interpretation in case of weak evidence. Rhetorical analysis accepts 
documents in organizations as a form of communication tool created to convince (or 
manipulate) the reader of their truthfulness rather than of the actual truth. From a narrative 
and rhetorical perspective, sensemaking is accepted as a process of creating various subjective 
explanations of presented information (Brown, 2000).  
Studies of rhetorical analysis approach in public inquiry explore the possibilities of how 
secondary reports support the validity of social institutions. This approach sees inquiry report 
as a method created to persuade and convince others of questionable believes (Brown, 2000). 
Furthermore, this approach assumes that actors during public inquiry will embed their own 
interpretation in the reports. It argues that since reports are gathered from other texts, it need 
to be interpreted in relation to other texts (Brown, 2000).  
 
2.6 Summary 
I have in this chapter, presented theories that have provided me the theoretical framework for 
this thesis. I have presented few theoretical descriptions about risk and uncertainty in a 
complex environment. Furthermore, I have presented rational choice theory and various 
investment valuation tools used by oil companies related to this theory. Finally, I have 
presented sensemaking theory to describe actors’ process of sensemaking in an uncertain and 
complex environment.  
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My goal is to give the reader an understanding of the terms and main concepts, since I see this 
as necessary for reader in order to be able to understand and interpret my findings and the 
discussion regarding this. 
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     Chapter3 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
“We are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders og giants. Wee see more, and things that 
are more distant, than they did, not because our sight is superior or because we are 
taller than they, but because they raise us up..”. 
John of Salisbury 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research method used to collect data, analyze it, 
and draw valid and reliable conclusion. I will discuss the reason for choosing my 
philosophical position and arguments for qualitative and quantitative methods. Further, I will 
discuss the tools that are used for collecting and analyzing data. Finally, evaluate the data in 
term of ethical considerations, reliability and validity of the task will be presented.  
 
To illustrate my problem statement, I have used both primary and secondary data in this 
thesis. The primary data is from interviews with informants that have much experience in the 
petroleum industry, and the secondary data comes from reports, news stories etc.  
 
What is methodology? 
A researcher tends to contribute to our knowledge about how reality is in both the small and 
large world and has to do this methodically. The word method comes from the Greek word 
merhodo, which means to follow a certain path towards a goal (Johannessen, et all, 2011). 
Methodology is about how to proceed in a certain situation in order to get full information, 
how to analyze data, and, how to interpret data. This method is also of significant importance 
in empirical science.   
 
According to Hellevik (2002), methodology helps us to choose correctly. It gives us an 
overview of alternative methods and the consequences of certain choices. By looking at 
methodology, one can benefit from other researchers’ previous experience, and therefore 
increase the chance of finding the desired results. 
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3.2 Philosophical position 
3.2.1 Ontology 
The theory of ontology refers to the philosophical assumption regarding reality. It has four 
main categories: realism, internal realism, nominalism, and relativism (Easterby-Smith et al, 
2012). The difference between these is their perception of reality. In my thesis, I will use the 
relativism approach, which argues that truth in reality is a consensus between different 
viewpoints of different actors and that “truth” and facts depend entirely on the observer. The 
different viewpoints in this thesis are from informants I have interviewed. Relativism also 
argues that researcher must be aware that their knowledge could have an impact on what 
could be perceived as fact (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
 
Relativism argues further that before one can analyze and conclude a phenomenon, the 
researcher has to obtain an overall picture of the situation at hand. Therefore, I would like in 
this thesis to present an overall historic picture of the past oil price shocks and the impact this 
had on oil production and investment. I believe that relativism ontology will be a good base 
for me to begin my methodological approach.   
 
3.3.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology is how to acquire knowledge, meaning what we know about reality and how we 
can proceed in order to gain knowledge of society and people (Johannessen et al., 2011).  
Epistemology is divided into two approaches: positivism and social constructionism. It is 
often difficult to follow only one aspect of these two epistemological views since they are 
defined as stereotypes. On one side, positivism argues that knowledge is built on what we 
observe, and everything else is speculation. While constructionism states that there may be 
forces and structure behind a social life that one cannot observe (Johannessen et al., 2011). In 
this thesis, I have chosen epistemology in the form of social constructionism because I feel 
this will give me a better understanding of the complexity of my research topic.   
 
The purpose of this thesis is to focus on what tools that are used for investment decisions, and 
how managers make sense of investment decisions in time of uncertainty. I have assumed that 
decision behavior is based on more elements than numbers and calculations alone. Because of 
this assumption, it was logical for me to choose a qualitative approach. 
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There is a great focus on individuals and individual behavior during my collection and 
interpretation of data findings. This is also something that a constructionist approach 
recognizes. Further, according to Easterby-Smith et al (2012), ontology in the form of 
relativism and constructionism in the form of epistemology are theories that could be 
combined together, which further led me to choose these approaches. 
 
3.4 Research design 
Research design is generally about organizing different research activities. This includes, 
among others, the process of collecting desired data. By employing good research design, a 
researcher will most likely be able to gain a better “flow” in their activities, and hence, be 
more efficient. In other words, research design refers to the choices of what should be 
observed and the process of how this should be done. (Esterby-Smith et al, 2012).  
 
 
                         Figure 2: Qualitative and quantitative methods (Easterby- Smith et al, 2012) 
 
Naturally, the problem statement and phenomena determine the choice of method. The 
method is dependent on whether the researcher wants to test existing theories or develop their 
own. The literature identifies two approaches in methodology: qualitative and quantitative 
Ontology	
How	does	the	world	work?	
Epistemology	
What	knowledge	can	we	obtain?	
Method		
How	do	we	get	the	knowledge?	
Qualita^ve	 Quan^ta^ve	
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methods. The main difference between these two approaches, in short, is the difference in the 
techniques of collecting, analyzing and interpreting the data (Easterby-smith et al, 2012).  
 
The qualitative-oriented method is a method of generating knowledge by investigating what 
influences a certain experience had on those who experienced it, also how it can be 
interpreted and understood by others actors. The quantitative method is typically presented as 
a contrasting approach, which has a focus on numbers and what is measurable (Johannessen 
et al, 2011).  
 
3.5 Design choice 
My topic choice and the basis of my problem statement were prepared early in the process 
with the support of my professor and supervisor June Borge Doornich. The purpose of my 
thesis has always been to find out more about limitation and challenges in times of 
uncertainty, such as the uncertainty regarding the oil price shocks. However, as I further 
investigated this topic, I began to grasp the extent of this topic, and gradually set my focus 
mainly on the investment decision behavior oil companies. 
 
In the basis of this statement, it was natural to use a qualitative approach in this thesis, in the 
form of semi-structured interviews to understand the phenomena of management uncertainty 
in the oil industry. A qualitative approach resulted in a much better closer participation of 
informants, which again helped achieve a deeper and more extensive understanding of my 
problem statement.  
 
 I also recognize that my awareness of the surrounding environment, in terms of my values 
and existence, could have an influence on the research procedure, and also the sampling and 
interpretation of data. I recognize the importance of this topic, and that it should be studied in 
most professional way, by interviewing informants that have vast experience and knowledge 
at managerial level within the petroleum industry. I recognize further that this thesis could be 
beneficial for other researchers as well, which motivates me to produce a high-quality thesis. I 
have used various existing scientific reports and articles on this topic.  
 
I will in this thesis use a case study approach in the research design. Although I am fully 
aware that there are many other approaches a researcher can chose, such as cross-sectional 
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studies, longitudinal study, quasi-experiment, experiment, ground theory and others 
(Johannessen et al., 2011).  
 
3.6 Case study 
One of the main strengths of conducting a case study approach is that the researcher can 
collect a significant amount of data from very few units or sources in a certain amount of time 
(Thagaard., 2013). Considering that I have three expert interviews, this was the main reason 
for my choice of case study. 
 
Yin (2013) states that a case approach is preferable when “how” or “why” questions is 
answered and when the researcher has little control over situations, and when the focus of the 
particular phenomenon is in the real world, which is the case in this study. I have to 
thoroughly study the “how” and “why” in the phenomena and term of the process of 
investment decision making behavior. In addition, I have to create an understanding of how 
uncertainties such as oil price shocks affect oil companies’ investment decisions. I therefore 
believe that the problem statement fits within Yin’s central criteria (Yin, 2013). 
 
The findings should be interpreted in the light of already existing theories. Based on the 
findings, the case study will play an important role in whether to maintain the existing theory, 
to develop it, or to establish new theories. By performing a case study, it will be both possible 
and interesting to observe how the various informants consider sensemaking in investment 
decisions that are made in oil companies.   
 
3.7 Data collection 
At the very beginning of my data collection, I found that the best way to do this process was 
by searching through previous research that had a similar topic to my thesis. This was to get a 
better understanding of the topic and of what to do next, and further, to be able to distinguish 
between relevant and irrelevant data. 
Social constructionism studies are typically quite complex and require many variables and 
factors that play an important role in finding answers. By using a case study approach, the 
researcher is able to collect various rich data to make the research more credible, and also to 
present the problem statement in the best possible way.  
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To achieve this, I used data gathering tools form of both primary and secondary data. 
Primary data is defined as new data that is collected directly by the researcher, while 
secondary data is already-existing data (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Primary data is as 
mentioned, collected through expert interviews with highly experienced people from the oil 
industry. Because of geographical distance, my interviews were conducted through telephone. 
At first, I considered Skype or similar communication tools, but because of some technical 
difficulties, I decided not to proceed with this. However, I believe that telephone interviewing 
was sufficient to collect the information I required.  
 
The choice of informants was based on strategic selection. The criteria were that at least two 
of my informants had experience from project and strategic analysis. I feel that I achieved this 
since all three of my informants have had, or still have key positions in the oil industry. They 
are very much familiar with what factors that there is that determines investment decisions. 
 
During my first interview, I noticed that some of my questions did not seem to obtain the 
deeper answers I was looking for, and I therefore had to, on several occasions, rephrase my 
questions or ask spontaneous questions as we moved further into the interview. I also 
reminded myself, both during the interview and after, that the “unsaid” could be as revealing 
and important as what was said by the informants.  
 
Interviews were audio recorded, and then transcribed. The purpose for using a sound recorder 
was to save time by not having to take notes, and so I could fully concentrate during the 
actual interview. Another advantage of audio recording was because of the encoding after. 
One could easily search for words or phrases in the interviews and use them in my empirical 
chapter. Furthermore, in order to ensure that all my questions were answered accordingly, I 
also took notes during my interviews. This also helped me to detect new potential findings 
that had been raised during the interview.   
 
I also find it important to mention that during the interview, informants at times touched on 
topics such as companies advanced mathematical, valuation models that I, with my 
educational background did not always comprehended the concept at first. However, in these 
situations, informants presented practical examples to ensure that I understood the overall 
image of the concept.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
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 In order to avoid misinterpretation and improve the quality of the interview, the transcription 
was done “word-for-word”.  However, a researcher must also be critical of his transcription 
since human error could occur during this process. To avoid this issue, I listened to the 
interview once more to see if the transcript was in line with what actually was said.  
 
3.7.1 Semi-structured interviews 
There are two different approaches for conducting interviews, semi- structured and 
unstructured interview. As mentioned, these has been conducted a semi-structured interview 
in this study. I first made an interview guide with few different questions, or rather topics that 
I would discuss with informants during the interview. By doing this, informant could interpret 
the questions in their own way and perception of reality and sensemaking of what was 
important to address in the topic. Furthermore, I felt that this interview approach gave the 
flexibility to create new question and topics during the actual interview. 
 
This interviewing approach gave me the opportunity to better understand the reality of 
sensemaking in decision making, and to rethink my problem statement. This is because this 
study involved building knowledge about a context I had no comprehensive knowledge of 
from previously. I knew to some extend that oil companies use various financial models, but 
my knowledge around final decisions making and analytical tools was limited at the 
beginning phase. However, I began shortly to comprehend the context and was able to study 
the problem statement at a higher, more complex level.  
 
Although semi-structures interview offer great contribution when collecting data, I have also 
acknowledged that there could be some weaknesses to this approach. I have recognized that 
the interaction between interviewer and informant could have some potential disruption. 
Interviews are normally characterized as unpredictable, which again could lead to challenging 
issues regarding ethical or methodological. In order to deal with this issue, I have taken a 
reflexive thinking during the interviews (Alvesson and Skøldberg, 2009). 
 
3.7.2 Reflexivity 
According to Alvesson and Skøldberg (2009), the concept of reflexivity is typically 
introduced in qualitative research as in this thesis and is accepted as a method in which the 
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researcher has the opportunity to validate their findings. Reflexivity refers to the recognition 
of the researchers’ self-perception and research relationship. This concept argues that 
interviewers value perception, presence etc., and this could affect research decisions, such as 
interpreting data and writing the conclusion. Therefore, the whole research process requires 
reflection. Reflexivity is about having an open mind during the interviews, and being aware 
that both the interviewer and respondent are involved in the process. 
 
I have recognized this in this thesis and have reflected on my research by examining my 
relationship with my informants and also examined how this relationship dynamic could 
affect my informant’s responses to the questions. Furthermore, this approach has allowed me 
to be more vigilant in my thinking and always be expect so sort of disruption of compromise 
in research method or ethics (Alvesson and Skøldberg, 2009).  
 
3.7.3 Documents 
When I refer to secondary data in this thesis, this is data that I have collected which already 
exists in the form of articles, annual reports, and public governmental data. This kind of data 
is usually available to the public and is used to provide a historical perspective and 
understanding. This is quite useful to obtain a foundation for the research. One of the biggest 
pros of using secondary data is that, compared to using primary data it is much less time 
consuming. The secondary data I collected was from several scientific databases, such as 
Google Scholar, ScienceDirect and Scopus. There are significant amount of published reports 
about historical oil price shocks which as been very relevant and helpful for getting insights 
an grasp the context of the complexity and uncertainty regarding the oil price. 
 
Whilst preparing this thesis, I have also contacted governmental and non-governmental 
companies and departments whilst collecting my secondary data. Unfortunately, most of them 
did not voluntarily provide me with the historical data I needed. Some claimed that the data I 
requested was not available for public viewing while others stated that the data did not exist in 
their database.  
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3.8 Data analysis and findings 
 The purpose of the analysis process is to organize all the collected data and identify a 
possible connection between the data. After my interviews, I transcribed them and created a 
word document in which I recorded my findings according to the topics discussed. This gave 
me a better overview of my findings and was very helpful in the analysis process. This 
analysis method is also used by Jacobsen (2005), as we can see from the figure below.  
 
 
               Figure 3; Dana analysis (Jacobsen, 2005) 
 
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), a researcher should use a “constant comparison 
model” to analyze gathered data. This means coding and analyzing at the same time. They 
created the following four steps:  
1. Compare findings that fit with each category. 
Data will be encoded in categories. As the number of categories increases, there will 
be several different categories; those that the researcher self-constructs, and those that 
contain specific statements from informants. When the data is analyzed several times, 
the researcher will see that there are several ways of understanding the topic, and 
should then start to create memos. During this process, it is important to be aware of 
the choices that are made.  
2. Integrate categories and decide where they belong. 
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This process begins by reviewing the memos and evaluations that are produced in the 
first step of the process. After the data is collected on the basis of theory, the theory 
can be used in the analysis to create new knowledge.  
3. Refine new theory 
 
4. Creating new theory 
 
The purpose of this study is not to develop new theory, but rather to gain a better insight into 
problem statement. Therefore, it is natural for me to disregard steps 3 and 4.  
 
The data that is generated through this process is then inserted into a narrative analysis. The 
narrative is a story, where the researcher can, during the analysis, vary between being a so-
called “story-finder” looking for stories during the interview, or be a “story- creator” who 
creates a story by putting together many events (Johannessen 2011). The analysis will then 
become a coherent story and is organized to describe what the researcher wants to explore. 
Thus, the encoding process will be the basis of the storyline and theory. Although his process 
has several advantages, the main purpose here is so that researcher can detect important 
elements that they would not have found otherwise (Johannessen, 2011).  
 
3.9 Validity and reliability 
3.9.1 Validity 
Validity in qualitative research concerns whether the researchers have measured what they 
actually intended to measure. Within validity, we can distinguish between internal and 
external validity. Internal validity focuses on whether the research findings are consistent with 
reality, and external validity focuses on how well the results of the study can be transferred to 
other cases. Although my intention with this thesis has not been to generalize findings to other 
cases, I strongly believe that my findings could be transferred to other cases as well in the 
same context of uncertainty. 
 
I attempt in my study to raise the validity by using several different sources. I may have 
conducted relatively few interviews, however, the interviews were with informants that have 
much experience and much knowledge of the energy industry. Therefore, I am confident that 
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the information provided by them is valid. I have also had the opportunity to discuss my 
problem statement with several other people who work in the energy industry.  
 
3.9.2 Reliability 
Reliability is related to the accuracy of the research findings, which kind of data can be used, 
the way data is collected, and how it is processed (Johannessen et al, 2011). As mentioned 
earlier, all my interviews were transcribed, this significantly increases the likelihood that all 
the information was correct. However, coming back to reflexive thinking, one weakness of 
the reliability of the qualitative data is if the researcher and informant have different views on 
the topic. This could mislead the researcher when interpreting responses from informants. 
Because of this risk of possible misinterpretation or findings, I have in my empirical chapter 
used quotation to avoid occurrence of this issue. This is to present the reader of what 
informants have responded during interviews and give further assurance them of the studies 
reliability.  
 
One other thing that can strengthen the reliability is how the interview guide and questions are 
build. It is important to ensure that questions in the interview guide are not leading questions 
nor are structured questions. Researchers should, therefore, put themselves in their 
respondents’ situation to get an impression of the questions that could be interpreted as 
leading. If, for a different reason, there is the necessity to test the data reliability, one can 
retest this under identical conditions. If the results turn out to be the same, then they are likely 
to be highly reliable. Because of my limited timeline, I have unfortunately not had the 
opportunity to conduct a new case with identical conditions. Furthermore, it is nearly 
impossible to conduct identical qualitative cases. This would be more suitable for a 
quantitative study.  
 
3.10 Ethical considerations 
Ethics is one of the most important things to consider when conducting a research study. The 
researcher has to take responsibility for carrying out the survey in accordance with the 
scientific guidelines and limitations. I believe that I have had a strong focus on ethical 
principles and have not violated any rules. I have been honest and open with all my 
interviewees and have taken their wishes into account, during and after the interviews. I have 
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also been aware to not thrust my informants and persuade them to answer any questions that 
they were not comfortable with. 
 
One of the focuses before, and during the expert interviews was to not interrogate the 
informants, but rather gather the necessary information needed for your research through a 
“normal conversation”. Furthermore, every interview must have the informants consent 
before recording, and every respondent has the right to ask for confidentiality or anonymity if 
they wish so (Johannessen et al, 2011). One of my informants wished to remain anonymous, 
and one other was also not completely sure about sharing his experience and personal 
knowledge about of the industry and publically. Because of this and more, I have decided to 
make all my informants anonymous.  
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    Chapter 4 
4. Empirical Findings 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts with an introduction of the context, which is the uncertainty and 
complexity in the oil industry. I will first give an overview of some factors of supply and 
demand in the oil industry, and then give a historical view of the geopolitical and financial 
events that have influenced the oil shock. 
 
I will then present the empirical data based on its relevance to my problem statement. As 
mentioned in the introduction to my thesis, the purpose of my study is to explore what 
decision tools are used in oil companies’ investment decisions. Due to content limitations, I 
will refer to my findings to give an overall view of what it indicates. 
 
Finally, I will present what informants consider as the key factors behind investment 
decisions in oil companies. Further, I will present a constructed view of corporate issues 
regarding industry uncertainty and investment decisions. Data will be presented via citations 
and text. I believe this to be a good way to present a rich and meaningful perspective of what 
empirical data suggests.  
 
4.2 Context 
Crude oil, or “black gold”, is one of the most precious products in the world. Its price 
development influences the entire global economy. This means that if reliable oil price 
prediction were achievable, the global economy forecast would as a consequence be 
significantly improved. However, because of the volatility in this industry, this has not yet 
been possible to achieve. The recent oil price shock in 2014 emerged within a few months and 
had an overwhelming impact on the global economy. There were only a handful of analysts 
that predicted outcome similar to this (Eder et al, 2015).  
 
The price of crude oil can be affected by events that could potentially disrupt the supply flow. 
Historically, there have been mainly due to geopolitical or economic events. These events 
normally have lead to global uncertainty regarding supply and demand of a commodity, 
which again have caused price volatility. I will in this section give further illustration of this.  
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Demand 
Rapid economic and industrial growth by non-OECD (The Organisation for Economic and 
Cooperation and Development) countries in recent years has changed the pattern of demand. 
According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), oil demand from non-OECD 
countries increased from 2000 to 2010 by more than 40 percent, while oil consumption in 
OECD countries experienced a steady decline. The largest growth in oil consumption was in 
China, India, and Saudi Arabia. China, worlds most populated country, has today become the 
largest oil importer in the world, and together with other major non-OECD countries will play 
even a bigger role than earlier in the years to come (Bajpai, 2015). The country’s total oil 
consumption is expected to increase by nearly three million barrels per day in 2020 compared 
to 2012 (Cunningham, 2015).  
 
Supply 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with its 12 member nations 
has for several decades been the largest supplier of conventional oil. They have controlled the 
marked and determined prices by the boosting of the reduced level of production. According 
to IEA estimates, the OPECs have 1206 billion barrels of oil reserves, which accounts for 
81% of the world’s crude oil. Saudi Arabia and Venezuela alone account for almost half of 
this volume (Bajpai, 2015). Although their power have weakened at some degree in recent 
years due to development of unconventional oil, OPEC’s every activity is observed closely 
observed by governments, oil companies, and other stakeholders continue to play a major 
role. Geopolitical events have a great impact on OPEC policies. Several of the organizations’ 
member nations are politically unstable or have political disputes with the West. And some 
have experienced sanctions by the Western world. This has triggered several supply 
disruptions in the past (Cunningham, 2015).  
 
Oil Price 
As IS (Islamic state) forces were advancing towards the gates of Baghdad and Damascus in 
2014, potentially disrupting major suppliers of crude oil, there were few people in the energy 
industry that suspected oil price shock. Despite many unpredicted events in the world, such as 
the Arab spring and the American energy renaissance, the oil price had been relatively stable 
for several years. This is mainly since the supply disruption from several OPEC members that 
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gave the opportunity for shale oil production in US to grow without any significant global 
imbalance (Bordoff and Losz, 2015).  
 
However, because of OPEC’s policy change and rapid increase in North American 
production, the global marked experienced an oversupply of oil in the third quarter of 2014. 
The decrease in price first began after the liberation of Libya which caused supply resumption 
from the country, and continued to decrease even after the supply disruption few months later. 
The situation also accelerated dramatically when Saudi Arabia, the most influential member 
of OPEC, refused to cut production levels and kept production at a high level of 32 million 
barrels per day (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). 
 
To understand the context of unpredictability and volatility of the oil industry and oil price, I 
will now briefly present few historical geopolitical and economical events that have cause oil 
price shocks. 
 
4.2.1. Historical overview 
Most of the world´s conventional oil resources today are located in regions with great 
instability and that have caused disruption in supply at some point in history. The oil industry 
has experienced several price shocks during these past decades as a result of major 
geopolitical or financial events. Geopolitical events include the Arab oil embargo in 1973-74, 
the Iranian revolution in 1978, the Iran-Iraq war at the beginning of 1990s, and the Gulf war. 
Global financial events include the Asian crisis in 1996, and the famous global financial 
collapse in 2008 (EIA, 2002). 
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Figure: 4 Oil crude and key geopolitical and economic events. (EIA, 2016) 
 
4.2.1.1 Political  
 
The Iranian revolution 1978-1979 
The Iranian revolution began in 1978 and resulted in a supply reduction of 3.9 million barrels 
per day of conventional oil exported from the country, between the years 1978 to 1981. This 
was in a time where world supplies appear to be very sensitive to every changing even. 
Although other OPEC members covered most of this shortage, the global market was still 
quite unstable. Further, the Iran-Iraq war began shortly after the revolution in 1980, and led 
several Gulf countries to reduce their output. This naturally had an impact on the cartel as an 
organization. The cumulative production level from the cartel dropped nearly 7 million barrel 
per day during this period (EIA, 2002).  
 
This high oil price cost made exploration and development in non-OPEC countries, which had 
been too expensive to develop earlier, more profitable. Development in areas such as the 
North Sea, Mexican Gulf, and Alaska began during this period contributed significantly to 
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world demand. By 1985, production from these regions accounted for 69 percent of global 
production, an increase of nearly 50 percent from 1978. OPEC reacted to this production 
development and tried to defend its $34 per barrel price by reducing production level further. 
At the same time, the U.S. began to increase its crude oil imports from non-OPEC countries 
such as Norway (EIA, 2002).  
 
The Gulf War 1990-1991 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait caused the third global oil shock in 17 years. During this period, the 
United Nations (U.N.) approved the blocking of all oil supplies from both countries. This lead 
again to the fear of an oil shortage similar to the previous crisis in 1979. Between July and 
August 1990, the oil price jumped from $16 per barrel to over $28 per barrel and escalated 
further to $36 per barrel in September that year. The price gradually began to drop again in 
October 1990, when the U.N. approved the use of military force against Iraq. The so-called 
oil crisis lasted no more than two months (EIA, 2002). 
 
Supply shortage from these two countries combined, which was about 4.3 million barrels per 
day, tested the modern petroleum market. The marked had experienced few great changes 
since the oil crises in 1978-79 and oil had become a more important global commodity. 
Therefore, it seemed beneficial for nations from both supply and demand side attempted to 
keep the market balanced (EIA, 2002).  
 
 
 
Figure: 5. The main military conflicts in the Middle East that have affected the global oil 
supplies (Baghirov and Rodzko, 2014)  
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4.2.2.2 Economic 
 
The Asian financial crisis 1997-1998  
The Asian financial crisis began in 1997 and was a short period of crisis that affected at first 
the Asian continent, but gradually began to induce fear of a global economic crash. The crisis 
originated in Thailand in 1997, but later spread to other Southeast Asian countries, such as 
Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Japan. This uncertain situation naturally affected 
investments in most of these countries, and other developing countries, which lead to 
economic recession in large part of this regions (Olowe, 2010).  
 
The oil price maintained a relatively stable price at $15-20 dollar per barrel during the first 
half of the 1990s. But began to decline rapidly in 1997, to a price as low as $8 dollar per 
barrel towards the end of 1990s. This price collapse was different from the 1986 supply crisis, 
where commodity demand was the key factor (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). 
 
Before the crisis, the demand for oil was strong and increasing, mainly due to the rapid 
economic growth in the Asian Pacific countries and the growing industrialization of countries 
in that region. As a consequence, the demand for oil in this region, especially in China, 
naturally increased. During the same period, several countries inside OPEC were disregarding 
their original quotas and increased their production significantly. Iraq, increased production 
from 0.6 million barrels per day in 1996, to 2.1 million in 1998. Non-OPEC countries 
contributed 3.7 million barrels per day to the global market between 1993 and 1998 (Bordoff 
and Losz, 2015).  
 
OPEC decided to lift the quotas and increased production level at their meeting in Jakarta in 
1997. This decision was mainly made because of the assumption of continued economic 
development in the Asian countries that would require further demand. Further, it was also 
because of the belief that other non-OPEC countries were producing more than their original 
quotes, thus attempting to gain global market share (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). OPEC was 
clearly unaware of the pending Asian economic development and was not concerned about 
unpredictable events that would change the market circumstances, such as oversupply that 
would lead to oil price shock. OPEC increased its production at almost the same time as 
Asian demand was started declining. The Thai currency collapsed in July 1997, spreading 
panic through the entire Asian market, and putting a short term end to the demand. As a 
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consequence, the oil price decreased by 50 percent between October 1997 to December 1998 
(Bordoff and Losz, 2015) .  
 
The price recovered swiftly again after the two-year crisis and tripled to approximately $30 
between 1999 and 2000. As a result of this crisis and the unnecessary challenges it brought 
due to speculations, oil supply countries, including OPEC, agreed to restrain their production 
level to a certain extent to avoid similar events in the future (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). 
 
The financial crisis 2008-2009 
After many years of low oil prices and under-investment in production, the emerging 
economy of China and other countries at the beginning of the 2000s overwhelmed the oil 
market. Supply was struggling to keep up with demand, and the price was reaching new 
heights year after year, reaching $147 in July 2008 (Bordoff and Losz, 2014). The financial 
crisis in 2008 and a fall in demand then caused a sharp decrease in oil prices to a low point of 
$30 per barrel at the end of 2008, causing an instant panic throughout the entire Western 
market, and other markets as well (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). 
 
However, the oil industry recovered relatively quickly from this crisis. Price of oil started to 
increase again shortly after the crisis, and ultimately increased to over $100 per barrel per day 
and remained stable until recent crisis (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). 
 
This quick rebound of the industry was due to several events that eventually led to an increase 
in price. The main reasons were due to a quick demand upturn from non- OECD countries. 
OPEC members decided in 2008 to cut their production level by 4.2 million barrels per day to 
maintain global balance. Despite that the cartel reduced their production by 2.4 million, which 
is approximately 60 percent of what they originally promised, it still had a significant impact 
on the market (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). 
 
4.2.3. 2014 crisis 
 
After the Arab oil embargo in 1973, the power in oil supply changed from the U.S. to OPEC, 
and to Saudi Arabia in particular, and the cartel has controlled the global market since then. 
Today, there are only few members in this organization that have the spare capacity to 
balance production levels in the case of supply disruption from other members (EIA, 2002). 
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OPEC has, for decades, “balanced” the market in the case of supply surplus by cutting their 
production level. However, in 2014, Saudi Arabia announced that the organization would not 
attempt to stabilize the marked by cutting production levels, but rather let it balance itself with 
low oil prices (Spano, 2016).  
 
“The American oil revolution of the past few years has been one of the most 
geopolitically consequential events in the global oil market in decades” 
     (Bordoff and Losz, 2015) 
 
One of the main causes that directly lead to our new oil price crisis is the unexpected rapid 
growth of the U.S. tight oil production. Horizontal drilling technology combined with 
hydraulic fracturing has become a blessing for the American oil and gas industry. This 
technology was at first used in natural gas production, but later was also implemented for 
production of unconventional oil. This has increased the country’s production level by 80 
percent (four million barrel per day) during the past ten years. Due to this development, U.S 
oil imports has fallen by nearly 40 percent, to a level of 19 million barrels per day in 2014. 
Furthermore, the country has projected that average level of imports in 2025 will be 14 
million barrels per day less than was projected few years back (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). 
 
This American production development has been one of the biggest geopolitical events that 
has significantly changed the global supply and demand market in several ways. First, it has 
weakened OPEC’s capacity to control the supply market. Secondly, this oversupply 
development has the potential to weaken the oil price for many years to come, which will be 
beneficial for oil-demanding countries such as China, India and Japan. Finally, this current 
low oil price will also have a global environmental impact. The rising demand in oil and the 
low oil price will in the short term outdo other more harmful alternative subsidies. However, 
it will also make renewable energy recourse alternatives non-profitable, which is not 
beneficial for environment (Bordoff and Losz, 2015). 
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4.2.4. Recent oil drop: different or similar? 
 
Although this sudden fall in oil prices is significant, there have been other similar events 
during the past three decades. As we can see from the figure below, the industry has 
experienced five other major episodes of oil price decline that have shocked the world. Oil 
price in all five situations decreased at minimum 30 percent over a seven month period. The 
first oil crisis was in 1985-86 when OPEC began to shift their production policy. The other 
four situations after this were the U.S. financial crisis (1990-91 and 2001), the Asian Crisis 
(1997-98), and the financial crisis (2008-2009) which was mainly driven by a decline in 
global demand (Baffes et al, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 6: oil price drop effects (Baffes et al, 2015) 
Although there have been five oil price shocks during the past three decades, the current crisis 
we are experiencing has most similarities with the aggressive increase in oil production from 
the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico in the 1980s which lead to the 1985-86 crisis. Both 
crises began with an aggressive increase in supply from non-OPEC countries (mainly the 
U.S.) and another aggressive reaction by OPEC countries to abandon their policy and increase 
production to push out competition (Baffes et al, 2015). 
 
The unconventional oil and gas extracting technology has been available for many years, and 
due to four years of high oil prices, non-OPEC countries such as U.S, Canada and Russia 
began extracting unconventional resources. However, the sudden drop in the oil price between 
2014 and 2015 had a devastating impact on the whole petroleum sector, especially for these 
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non-OPEC countries. Looking back to the 1970s, we can see similar scenario. The high oil 
price in 1970s and 1980s made expensive technologies, such as offshore technology, very 
profitable for the U.S. (The Mexican Gulf) and Norway (The North Sea). In fact, the 
combined production from these regions added $6 million day per day to the global market, 
which is approximately the same volume of unconventional resources that were added to the 
market in 2014 (Baffes et al, 2015).  
 
One other major similarity is the OPEC countries’ decision to abandon price targeting. After 
the oil price peaked in 1979, OPEC decided to reduce oil production in order to control the 
high price. They gradually continued reducing their production over the next six years, from 
30 million barrels per day in 1979 to 16 million barrels per day in 1985. This significant cut in 
supply reduced the oil price by 20 percent. OPEC later began to slightly increase its 
production again to 18 million barrels per day (by the end of 1985). This change in policy was 
one of the main reasons for the oil collapse that lasted almost two decades (Baffes et al, 
2015).  
 
In comparison, there are several differences between our current oil price shock and other 
crisis such as 2008 crisis. For example, the decline in the oil price in the current crisis has 
been more severe than other commodity prices in the market. Whereas the price of all 
commodities in 2008-09 declined relatively at the same rate. Second, market signals also 
indicate that today’s crisis has been driven by several factors (U.S. unconventional recourses, 
OPEC policy etc), while the 2008-09 and most other crisis was due to weakening in demand 
that led to an oil drop price and global uncertainty (Baffes et al. 2015)  
 
4.3 Tools for decisions  
Informants constructed tools for investment decision-making with various images. 
Furthermore, they seem to obtain the same image of investment decision tools, which tend to 
be sophisticated, mathematical tools. Most oil companies today operate as any other business 
and try to maximize profit for their owners. However, they also tend to recognize the 
limitation of these financial valuation tools, and tend to move from these tools to a qualitative 
approach when it comes final decision making process.  
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4.3.1 Tools  
 
 “Investment appraisal is extremely complex. There are so many uncertain factors that 
could go wrong, including what one believes about the oil price, what you think about 
the required return, what you think about the production profile, which option exists.” 
(Informant II)  
 
Projects in international oil companies are characterized by large investments with high 
uncertainty. Uncertainties regarding factors such as product volume, investment costs, 
scheduling, and not least the price of oil that could change at any moment. Considering these 
factors, a considerable planning is needed in order to conduct a thorough assessment of risks 
in the project. Various potential alternative outcomes and risks need to be documented and 
analyzed to provide evidence and guide management decisions.  
 
Oil companies seems to have evolved significantly since earlier historical oil price shocks, 
and have learned a great deal about their market fluctuations. This has naturally helped 
improve valuation models and become to a certain extent, more reliable in their projections 
than before. Informant II explained that  
“We have become much better with analyzing and forecasting today than we were in 
1985-86. This is because we have much more data, many more tools, and a much 
better insight than we had before.”  
 
To valuate investment decisions, oil companies today still use standard economic methods as 
any other profit-focused company. This is mainly because as typical projects in any industry, 
oil projects have a major form of investment over a long period of time, then a long period of 
income-generating production that relies on the market, and finally the project ends. This is 
very similar to general industrial investment analysis. Informant II explains:  
“…Net present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR) and different types of key 
KPIs (key performance indicators) are the most common and widespread methods in 
the industry to measure the profitability of various decisions.”   
 
In addition, most oil companies also apply a “risk-adjusted cash flow” formula and discount 
everything with the same interest rate. This means that if there are any annual loss risks, one 
 
 
 
47 
47 
can attribute this probability of loss directly to the cash flow, and adjust the fraction line 
instead of the yield. Sensitivity or decision-tree analysis also gives an indication of what 
happens with the NPV in case of unpredictable events, such as, for example, an oil price 
shock. This is because companies recognize the complexity and volatility of the industry, and 
attempt to be as flexible as possible in their planning and decision-making. Informant III 
explained,  
“It is important to recognize that the industry is a cyclical industry. I have been in this 
industry for 40 years, and I have been through four or five upturns and downturns, 
and it usually happens every five-six years. When you are in this business, you must be 
able to understand that there are cyclical activities”.  
 
4.3.2 Decision-makers  
 
“It is not possible to measure risk and uncertainty. It is not something you can do. You 
can analyze and attend, and maybe describe, but not measure,” (Informant II). 
 
It is clear that when oil companies are considering major investments, primarily offshore 
investments, which are typically worth tens of billions, a considerable amount of planning is 
needed, in order to try to conduct a thorough valuation of what is risk and what is not. They 
carry out a thorough valuation of their potential decision, considering all “thinkable” 
outcomes. However, the valuations are based on the current available data knowledge. Thus, 
there will always be some level of uncertainty linked to the valuation models. Informants 
construct the image that ultimately, it is up to top management to generate a qualitative 
valuation based on current, available knowledge. Informant III explains, “The final 
responsibility and decision rests with the top management of the company.”  
 
Informant II explains further,  
“…everything management does is based on their “gut feeling” and the input they 
receive. Nobody gives you the answer and says what you should do. There are people 
that give you a significant amount of documents which contain many calculations and 
recommendations, then it is up to the management to make a decision based on their 
interpretation.” 
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However, there were some conflicting opinions amongst the informants about the significance 
of top managements’ influence on investment decisions. One informant, which have great 
experience from the industry and have been personal adviser for Statoil executive 
management for several years, believes that despite the fact that top management have the 
final saying, they will eventually come to a consensus based on the concrete information that 
is provided to them from these analytical tools. As Informant I explains:  
“After all the valuations are made and presented, top management will essentially 
come to a crystal-clear conclusion. In the case of uncertainty, top management will 
understand whether to act one way or the other.” 
 
Informants expressed further the importance of team decisions when considering major 
investments in oil companies. They imply that decisions are not made by individuals, but 
rather by top management teams where each member possess vast experience in the industry, 
and who are familiar with major changes and crisis in the industry. The provided information 
is assessed and interpreted by the company’s management team, and they try to come to a 
consensus as regards the “right” alternative for the company.  
 
Furthermore, in case of consideration of investment where certain details regarding the 
project are missing, It is important that for management not to proceed with the project unless 
all the details are available. This is because it is the top management team that holds the 
“money -bag”, and it is they that hold be held accountable in case of unwanted outcomes, as 
will be presented in next section. They must therefore ensure that all information received 
from lower level management is correct and accurate.  
 
4.3.3 Strategy 
A company’s strategy is one of the main elements that could influence investment decisions. 
When considering a investment option, managers must often discern whether the possible 
investment decisions are in accordance with their strategic visions and goals. Companies will 
not invest in projects if it is not in accord to their long-term strategy. Furthermore, companies 
have to see the availability of the necessary resources that are required to carry out the project. 
Informant II explains,   
 “Even if you come across a project that is very profitable in Indonesia producing 
shoes, you will not go for it. So strategy will determine what you do…and it will be a 
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well thought-out approach to what we are good at, what we have expertise in etc.. and 
other factors as well that obviously influence what decision you end up taking.” 
 
Another element to consider is the possible synergy effects which occur as a consequence of 
the company’s investment decisions. Companies that have several similar projects should 
consider the possibility of integrating parts of the project. By doing this, the company can 
achieve lower costs on individual projects and increase the value of all projects. Such 
additional proves to be very valuable as new technologies and field discoveries have led to 
optimal production levels being higher than initially planned production. Informant III 
mentions the Ormen Lange project, which he was an important part of. 
“Our original plan was to build a plant for gas coming from Ormen Lange in the           
Norwegian Sea, and on the coast. However, during the planning, we also thought that 
this could be a hub in the future so that we would not just process gas from this field, 
but other fields in the Norwegian Sea as well, thus gaining better synergy 
effects…now they have built two other fields, and their gas will be brought to the 
Ormen Lange facility, and the capacity will increase. It has become a strategic 
infrastructure and better than what we could see for ourselves when we built the plant 
in 2004.”  
 
4.4 Luck 
 
 “You can as well ask a monkey where it (oil price) will stop, or throw a dart,”  
Torbjørn Kjus, DNB markets. 
 
Informants’ constructs an image that are more or less identical when it comes to factor of luck 
in invest decisions. As every industry with high uncertainty, there is a certain degree of luck 
that influences the outcome of every investment. This is something that that will always exist 
in in investment. Theoretically, top managers inside companies are expected to detect and 
consider every aspect of investment, even the elements that are impossible to detect. 
Informant II explained,  
 
“There are known knowns, the known unknowns, the unknown unknowns etc. There 
are so many things that could go wrong.”  
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This comment implies the difficulty of investment decisions in this sector. It is impossible to 
address every potential outcome of a decision. Therefore, one has to in many situations rely 
on the factor of luck. Luck has become especially important in time of crisis when there are 
great short-term uncertainties where companies could lose great deal of investments. 
Furthermore, informants imply that because of the unpredictability of the market, where 
uncertain events rarely are similar, luck could be considered as better than having experience 
and knowledge from the industry. Informant II explains further,  
“One can make a good decision (on paper) and get a bad outcome. Not everyone 
understands that. You may have done a really god job and have made a correct 
decision, but had a bad outcome. If you lose and go bankrupt and everyone laughs at 
you. Or you could have made a terrible decision that everybody should have laughed 
off, but then you got lucky and pulled the lottery ticket. Then everybody declares you a 
genius.”  
 
4.4.1 Project failure 
To obtain a contextual perspective on the constructed image of luck, I will present few 
examples of project failures from the industry that have resulted in significant loss of 
investment. Informants mention Statoil’s project failures, thus I will present their failures as 
illustration.  
 
According to informant II, the whole series of poor investment decisions could be traced back 
to the Mongstad scandal in 1987-88, which was one of the first over-budget projects in 
Norwegian history. As a result of miscalculation and other external events, the project had a 
budget excess of 7 billion NOK, or approximately 95 percent of the original budget. This 
eventually led to the resignation of Arve Johnsen, the CEO of the company at that time.   
 
“…It was a lot of money back then, and they had not estimated the cost correctly. So 
of course, the top managers had to go,” (Informant III).  
 
As a result of this scandal and the weakened oil price at the time, the newly appointed CEO, 
Harald Norvik, saw the for serious changes in the company’s corporate structure, and a more 
efficient business strategy. This was naturally to avoid similar setbacks in the future.   
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There have been many other projects that have experienced budget overrun since the 
Mongstad project. During the last 14 years alone, Norwegian petroleum projects have spent a 
total of more than 200 billion NOK. The cumulative miscalculation is approximately 16. 6 
percent. There are cases where certain projects have been miscalculated by more than 100 
percent (Taraldsen, 2015).   
 
Figure: 7. Project overrun: in millions on the Norwegian continental shelf (Taraldsen, 2015) 
 
One recent Statoil investment decision that has received attention is the company’s 
investments in North America. The company invested heavily in three geographical areas in 
the U.S. between 2008 and 2011 and continued to buy after this period. This was in a period 
when the price of oil was much higher than today and there were no credible indication of any 
significant change. So when the oil price began to decrease in 2014, the company suffered 
heavily. Last year, the write-offs from the company’s international operation were 42.7 billion 
NOK.  
 
Many analysts in Norway claim that Statoil has paid more for field development in this region 
than they would have initially paid in Norway (Storeng, 2015). This opinion is also shared by 
informants I, who describes these investments as simply unplanned. In case of major 
investment decisions such as this, more thorough planning and calculation is needed before 
any further action. 
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However, Informant II constructs a different image and describes these major losses of 
investment as an unfortunate outcome that occurred as a consequence of imbalance in supply 
and demand in the market.  
 
“…if anyone goes and buys a stock and loses 50 percent of that stock because of 
something. Was it foolish to buy the stock? As an economist toy should say that if the stock 
where priced in a marked with that price, then it was a fair deal when you bought it. This 
regards other things as well. What happened in US is that we experienced a sharp drop in 
gas price. Against what many thought would happen. Because it suddenly turned out that 
there was oversupply of gas in the country. Then you naturally got a price drop. And you 
were unlucky and bought before the price drop”. 
 
4.5 Summary 
Investment appraisal in oil companies is quite complex and there are many “known” and 
“unknown” uncertainties linked to each decision. When it comes to investment appraisal 
decisions, companies normally use standard appraisal tools similar to other industries. This 
reason for this is that as other companies, the companies has to make profit for the company 
shareholders and try to maintain an image of control and supervision of their investment 
decisions.  
 
On the other hand, informants also construct an image towards a qualitative approach. More 
precise, towards a sensemaking approach. They realize the high level of complexity and 
unpredictability of the industry, and decision-makers’ own realizations and interpretations of 
information which they receive the lower management. However, regarding the importance of 
managers’ own sensemaking, informants seem to constructing images that are conflicting. 
They also agreed to a certain degree on the importance of the “luck” factor in the outcome of 
their decisions. They seem to construct images of this topic based on their own viewpoints. In 
other words, they seem to select facts based on their own perception on reality.  
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			 	 	 	 	 Chapter 5 
5. Analysis and discussion 
5.0 Introduction  
This chapter presents the analysis part of the thesis. I will here analyze empirical data 
presented in chapter four which I gathered through expert interviews with informants that 
have had key positions in investment projects, and through comprehensive collection of 
secondary published data. The objective of this chapter is to explore what tools decision 
makers use for investment decisions and how managers make sense of investment decisions. 
 
 In this chapter, two main findings of the study are presented. At first, it is shown that 
investment decisions are based on premises of rational choice theory. Second, that investment 
decision during management of uncertainty is based on sensemaking process. I will here 
present typical procedures and influences regarding investment decision making inside oil 
companies. Thus, I will discuss the factor of luck in investment outcomes, decision making 
inside teams and public inquiry.   
 
Statoil’s investment decisions were often mentioned in term of bad long-term business 
planning within the oil industry. The company’s foreign investments decisions in North 
America have specially received great deal of attention in the media. The company had no 
way of knowing how the marked would react in the way it did when they made that decisions. 
Given the existing information about the market development at the time, it was reasonable to 
make the decision of expanding. However, given the high level of uncertainty that exists 
within the oil industry, negative future need to be considered. Without thorough planning for 
adverse market conditions, it would be impossible to make successful long-term decisions.  
 
Statoil investment behavior were based on the assumption that the oil price would remain at a 
three-digit level, and therefor thought they made a good decision by entering the North 
American market and invested quite heavily for several years. But what they did not 
anticipate was the rapid drop of oil price in 2014 that occurred because of several geopolitical 
reasons. Instead of having a situation where supply was lower than demand, which would 
have been positive for the company, the market had an opposite reaction, where petroleum 
prices were driven down. This event suddenly made a decision that was considered as good to 
begin with, to a bad one.  
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Informants implied how decisions like those made by Statoil can cause long-term challenges 
which companies are forced to manage. These bad decisions not only cause difficulties in the 
function surrounding the bad decision, companies would also face future decisions such as 
layoffs, which they may otherwise would not have if the earlier situations had been different. 
For instance, if Statoil had not made the costly investments as they did, they may have had 
more capital reserves to handle the oil crisis better. The situation with Statoil also hinted at 
another key finding that becomes evident when analyzing my data. Because of the complex 
and uncertain industry environment, decisions that may be characterized as “simple” and 
“uncomplicated”, becomes suddenly more critical in this industry. The long-term effects of 
decisions cannot be ignored. 
 
5.1 Rational tools for invest decisions 
As presented in previous chapter, regardless of the market uncertainty, the most common 
valuation method in oil companies today is the net present value (NPV) and internal rate of 
return (IRR). This is at some level understandable since, as informants imply, investment 
projects in the oil industry are considered as any other projects in other industries.  
 
As presented in chapter two, there are several reasons why these methods are so popular 
among oil companies, or rather companies in general, one of them being that projects are 
treated equally and there are same criteria for choosing between them. This method is 
expected to give an “acceptable” accuracy and have a very logical process, which makes it 
easy to understand and explain results from analysis to investors. It is based on the 
presumption to maximize shareholder’s financial assets. In other words, oil companies, or 
rather shareholders, wish to invest in the project with higher potential profit over costs. This 
presumption of the model fits rather perfectly for most oil companies in the world, as they are 
profit-focus companies. 
 
These analytical tools are as mentioned very useful when presenting future potential costs and 
profits to company’s various interest groups. Most importantly, shareholders, who are the 
backbone of the company, would naturally want to know if their interests are safeguarded. By 
using these easily understandable methods, it will further assure them that their common 
vision and goal are in line with company investment strategy.  
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Based on these presumptions, we can argue that this method is based on rational choice 
theory. As introduced in the literature review, rational choice theory sees actors as 
fundamentally rational in their decisions and actions regarding the process of decision 
making. Companies and top managers are considered to have the complete information about 
their alternatives and consequences. And because of these assumptions, it is natural to think 
that decisions are made at a company’s corporate level, rather than individual level. Assuming 
that a company operates as “privileged” group where all company members have a common 
goal and strive to achieve best possible investment outcome.  
 
As proposed in chapter two, the decision making process from a rational choice perspective, 
and goes through certain steps that eventually defines such action as rational. The fourth step 
of this process is to determine how to make best decision between various potential 
alternatives. In this situation, effective analyses of complex mathematical models are 
implemented. Mathematical models are often the basis of investment tools oil companies’ use 
today to appraise their investment decisions. Models such as net present value (NPV) and 
internal rate of return (IRR), which is the most common investment appraisal models in the 
industry can be considered as such tools. 
 
However, the answer one gets from net present value calculation is not necessarily always 
reliable. It is only correct if the assumption your analysis is based upon is accurate, and 
whether other factors affects influence your environment or not. Considering the complexity 
and high uncertainty associated with accuracy the oil industry, it is not surprising that this 
method has received some negative and recent criticism. 
 
Although these models are simple to understand and implement, they have some weaknesses 
that is not consistent with reality. One of them being that is does not take into account 
managers’ flexibility to change previous decisions and take into account unexpected marked 
change. In figure 9, I have summarized the most significant weaknesses with net present value 
and discounted cash flow. 
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Assumptions in the discounted cash flow 
models 
Actual Context 
Decisions taken now, cash flow is locked in 
the future 
Uncertainty variables in future income and 
expenses. All decisions are not taken “today,” 
since some can be postponed to later when 
the uncertainty is less. 
Project’s “mini company” and is independent 
from the whole company 
Network effects, diversification, relationships 
and synergy makes companies operate with a 
portfolio of projects and their cash flows. 
Sometimes a project cannot be treated 
without comparing others. 
When a project is initiated, it is only 
passively controlled 
Projects are usually actively managed 
throughout their lifetime. 
Future cash flows are easily determined and 
deterministic 
It is difficult to estimate future cash flows 
because they are usually random and risky by 
nature. 
A project’s discount rate is used as the 
opportunity cost of capital, and is 
proportional to the non-diversifiable risk 
There are many factors that lead to risk in the 
project, and some are diversifiable across 
multiple projects or over some period of time. 
All risks are considered through hurdle rate. Company and project risks may change over the life of the project. 
All factors that may affect project outcomes 
and investor value are reflected in the models 
through NPV and IRR 
Because of the complexity of external factors, 
it is difficult if not impossible to quantify all 
the factors and consider them in the cash 
flow. Events that are not taken into account 
can be significant and have strategic value. 
Unknown, intangible and immeasurable 
factors are valued at “zero” 
Many of these factors may have strategic 
value. 
 
Figure: 8   Difference between Cash flow assumption and actual context 
 
According to informants, it appears that most oil companies have at some level recognized 
these weaknesses in the NPV and IRR model, and therefore attempt to measure this risk and 
uncertainty behind investment decisions by adjusting the risk in cash flow and discount this 
with same interest rate. Oil companies also partially use real option method in a form of 
sensitivity analysis and decision tree analysis. As two of my informants highlighted, oil 
companies test each of their variables against the “what-ifs”, including any changes in oil 
price or reserves, instead of using the original projections.  
 
Furthermore, as mentioned in previous chapter, these mathematical models typically require 
significant amount of data that needs to be analyzed in order to give a rational interpretation 
about current situation, and give a solid prediction about the future. But as informants imply, 
these models have improved with time. Companies today have much more data available than 
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in previous crisis, which again improve the calculation and prediction of various investment 
decisions. Hence, this could create a feeling of control and perhaps would make it easier for 
top managers to determine investment decisions.  
 
One other benefit top managers could have using these rational tools is perhaps in case of 
investment failure. If a project happens to fail, as they occasionally do, top managers would 
have a quite “valid” explanation and justification of their decision, as they believe they acted 
rationally on the basis of these analytical tools.  
 
5.2 Limitation of rational thinking 
Considering the various uncertain non-linear of factors that could influence decision making, 
it is easy to recognize the limitations of rationality. As mentioned in chapter two, rationality 
has problems dealing with inadequate information and uncertain environments. This may 
mean that a company’s ability to act rational is limited by the strength of the mathematical or 
economic analysis. Also, the more complex and alternatives a decision have, the greater the 
restriction on making a fully rational decision. This may lead to difficulties when making 
rational choices, and the clarification of rational choices. Because of this, it is interesting to 
see that despite these various sophisticated analytical methods, top managers are the ones that 
ultimately make the final investment decision. This is where other theories, such as the 
Sensemaking Theory becomes interesting.  
 
Furthermore, when decision makers try to make objective decisions based on these valuation 
tools that assume long-term applicability and accuracy of key factors, they run into challenges 
when these factors naturally evolve or change in some other way. Because of these potential 
changes, plausibility becomes more relevant than accuracy when decision makers are forced 
to make decisions that impact business operations over long term. 
 
I have summarized below some differences in key elements of rational choice theory and 
plausibility assumption in sensemaking theory 
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Figure: 9   Compering key elements in rational choice and plausibility theory 
 
5.3 Sensemaking 
As introduced in the literature review, sensemaking is based on the assumption that people 
often encounter a stream of information and attempts to understand unexpected events. In 
other words, sensemaking is about finding plausible understanding of your unpredictable 
surroundings by gathering information, action, and then delineating from original plan, 
depending how credible the information gathered was. Sensemaking often occur when we 
experience high uncertainty and ambiguity, meaning that sensemaking gets triggered when we 
experience an unexpected event, such 
as crisis. The key function of 
sensemaking is about mapping the 
“unknown” world, since there exists 
certain events where the only way to 
understand you surrounding is 
attempting to explain the unknown.       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
As mentioned earlier, the oil industry is quite unpredictable and uncertain in many aspects. 
Because of various geopolitical and economical events, oil price are constantly changing and 
there are really no way of knowing next week’s oil price, and certainly not long-term price, 
which again indicates the complexity of every investment decision within the company.  
 
Firstly, a typical characteristic of investment in any industry is the importance of the factor of 
luck, and the oil industry is not an exception. Rather, luck plays perhaps a greater role in the 
oil industry. This becomes evident from the data, as two of my informants implied that in 
order to succeed in this business, the factor of luck is sometimes, or rather most of times, 
 
 
 
59 
59 
more important to have than business skill or knowledge. In other words, every investment 
decision is a gamble.  
 
Considering Statoil’s major investment losses in North America, informants are not 
harmonized with the way executive management of the company made sense of the 
investment decisions at the time. It seems that they approach different reality of this particular 
decision. One informants imply that these decisions were absolutely sensible and correct, and 
that this unwanted outcome we have today was simply because of several unlucky geopolitical 
events that was not possible to predicts at the time decision was made. Another informant 
implies that these decisions were poor. They should have used more time to consider every, 
and it was certainly not thoroughly planned, as it should have been done. Their different 
statements in this matter are quite interesting, since both of informants have great deal of 
knowledge and experience from the industry. 
 
By referring to the literature review from chapter two, it becomes clear that informants’ 
opinions are not in harmony with rational choice theory, but rather with the sensemaking 
theory. Informants seem to be constructing different perceptions of reality, hence the industry 
environment for legitimizing investment decisions. Consequently, they seem to get different 
sensemaking of the company’s decision. This way of grasping reality of decisions appears in 
both Weick and Ancona. 
 
5.4 Decision teams 
As mentioned in chapter four, informants reveal that there are a team of top managers in oil 
companies that makes the final investment decision to go one way or the other. They are 
provided with significant amount of information about different alternatives and scenarios 
from lower management level which they have to interpret and ultimately conclude. The 
purpose of this team decision process is naturally to get different viewpoints from members 
with great deal of knowledge from the industry. It is believed that by management meetings, 
they will build a platform for communication where they eventually will reach a “common 
ground” and come to a consensus of what are best decisions to make. This is also a 
description of sensemaking Ancona makes. 
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However, although informants claim that this process improves investment decisions for the 
company, they also acknowledge the fact that provided information are limited and there are 
no “real” or certain knowledge about future occurrences. Thus, there are no “right” answer or 
strategy of how to act. They simply have to create an image of the reality they are living in, 
by using the available resources they currently possess. This acknowledgement is coherent 
with the image of sensemaking created by Weick.  
 
Furthermore, as shown in previous section when Statoil’s investment decisions in North 
America was discussed, different actors normally have different opinions of what could be 
called a good decisions and what is not. Despite that each member have much knowledge of 
the industry and experienced several oil crisis during their time, it is important to recognize 
that these decisions team members have their own approach when it comes to interpreting 
data and create their own image of what decisions severs the company best. This could 
naturally cause consensus disruption amongst the top managers in the company.  
 
However, as illustrated in the Holub`s poem from the soldier training camp in Swiss alps in 
chapter two, sensemaking becomes indeed most important to achieve in these uncertain 
situations, when the road ahead are blurry and full of surprises. The executive team members 
will have to create a common strategy or so-called “story-map” about their current situation 
through data gathering, interpretation, communication and action. It is also important to 
recognize that new information about the marked will emerge along the way that will perhaps 
influence previous decisions.  
 
In addition, in an uncertain and complex environment such as our industry, it is perhaps better 
for top managers to not have the feeling of confident and control when mapping their 
environment and make decisions. If decision makers portrayed a picture of their reality that 
was more “objective” and constant, meaning that if they believed every event or crisis was 
exactly as the previous ones, they would naturally follow the same old strategy and fail. This 
is perhaps the case in the Mongstad scandal, where the CEO, Arve Johnsen and several other 
board members was forced to resign because of their poor investment judgment. 
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5.5 Public Inquiry 
One other factor that is important to present within the component of sensemaking is public 
inquiry, which is considered very important in the decision making process for oil companies, 
especially in time of uncertainty. In our case, this becomes relevant in two ways. Firstly, 
informants reveal that it is the lower management that uses mathematical models and creates 
alternatives and scenarios of potential decisions. After various calculations and projections, 
they present this data to top management with comments regarding each alternative. In this 
process, it is not unthinkable to argue that there could be potential for lower management 
giving their voice during this narrative and rhetorical presentation of the information they 
provide to the top management. This could disrupt, or rather mislead top managers 
sensemaking of the provided data and could eventually decide on one decision that they 
perhaps would not have been deciding if the data was presented differently. In this aspect, we 
can argue that lower management could have more to say in investment decisions than 
previously assumed, and could perhaps be called the real decision makers. 
 
Secondly, one other way public inquiry could play a role in decision making is the process of 
interpretation and sensemaking amongst top managers and their individual significance. 
Because of their individuality and different level of experience and knowledge of their 
environment, they will naturally think differently about potential investment decisions. Thus, 
it will be difficult to come to a consensus of what is best investment alternative to make for 
the company. In this case, it is not impossible to assume that some members inside the top 
management team will give their voice and attempt to influence other members’ opinions by 
using their social skill of story- telling in communication. Furthermore, there are naturally 
senior members inside the team that have higher voice than certain others have, and will be 
able to “heard” much easier. Senior members that have experiences many uncertain industry 
crises would perhaps be quicker able to “make sense” of the situations and create map 
(strategy) than others, and be able to influence other members sensemaking. As Ancona 
mentions in chapter two, this is one of the main reasons of sensemaking failure. In an 
environment of high uncertainty, events are rarely similar to one another. For example, as 
presented in chapter four, every previous oil price shocks we have experienced seem to have 
occurred because of different factors. Trying to create a common map based on previous 
events, and try to convince in order to come to a decisions consensus could be very harmful 
for sensemaking. 
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5.6 Never learn 
As pointed out in chapter fine, the image of realizing effective sensemaking in oil companies 
in time of crisis and uncertainty is not always achievable. My informants implied that oil 
companies, or rather top management, never learn from previous crisis and previous mistakes. 
Informant describes most oil company’s investment behavior as a “sheep flock”. In case of an 
uncertain event, as current crisis, they tend to reach out to past experience and react as they 
normally have done in previous events. Meaning that they invest heavily in good times, and 
cut heavily in bad times. This image constructed is quite descriptive and could perhaps 
explain oil companies continue investment failures. Further, it is coherent with Ancora’s 
explanation of the limitation of leadership’s sensemaking in uncertain times and crisis. 
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       Chapter 6 
6. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to explore what tools are for investment decisions in oil 
companies, and how decision makers make sense of investment decisions during uncertainty. 
The thesis proposes two main findings in relations to the problem investigated. 
 
i. Oil companies today use rational tools in their investment decisions. 
ii. Investment decisions are ultimately decided by top managements interpretation 
and sensemaking. 
 
Decision- making processes within the oil industry are difficult, especially in terms of what 
investment decisions should be made. Companies seem to rely heavily on rational tools in 
their valuation of investment decisions. There are significant amount of data that are gathered 
and inserted into sophisticated mathematical valuation model to determine each possible 
outcome of potential decision. Further, top managers are expected to make a rational decision 
based on these models. They are considered to have complete information about their industry 
environment, and therefore, foresee the outcome of their decisions.  
 
What has become clear in this study is that these rational tools alone are not sufficient 
enough. Because of the highly uncertain and complex industry, where any global events, such 
as geopolitical or economical could occur at any time that would disturb the global oil supply 
and demand balance, oil price shock, these valuation tools can only be taken so far before 
they reach their limitation.  
 
The research uncovered further how principle of sensemaking impact decision making 
process, particularly in term of plausibility. The outcome of investment decision is partially, if 
not fully, more dependent on luck than industry knowledge and experience. Therefore, when 
interpreting data, top management are compelled to use sensemaking process and attempt to 
come up with plausible understanding and meanings from available information and 
knowledge they have about the industry environment. This finding lead to the assumption that 
calculated accuracy from these rational investment valuations methods meet their limitation 
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during uncertainty, as oil companies are not able to forecast the ongoing flow of unpredictable 
and unforeseen events that may determine the outcome of an investment.  
 
Rational tools oil companies’ use will give indications of various future outcomes, but will 
certainly not give any conclusive information.  Investment decisions are therefore to some 
level based on top managers own sensemaking of information, which again leads to the 
possibility of decisions that could be interpreted as irrational and ill-conceived by others. 
Thus, we can argue that because of the limitation these rational methods, they can in a way be 
considered as a “tool for failure”.  
 
I feel that this study has been very interesting approach for exploring how sensemaking 
develops and becomes relevant in the context of investment decision in the highly 
unpredictable and complex oil industry. By examining how informants construct the reality of 
this, I feel that managers or other decision makers that operate under uncertainty could benefit 
from this study, as this study implicate that management under uncertainty demand more than 
only rational analytical tools, they should therefore me more conscious of their own way of 
making sense of their current situation. Furthermore, I feel that this topic I have studied have 
potential for further exploration. It would be interesting to use similar theoretical framework 
for investigating same problem statement in other industries. Although I believe, based on my 
interpretation of data that we would draw same conclusion in similar contexts.   
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Appendix 
Appendix 1  
Interview Guide 
Ranch Zangana 
Master of Science student at Nord University 
 
Er det greit at jeg tar opp denne samtalen? 
Er det greit at jeg nevner deg i oppgaven? 
Navn 
Lydopptak 
Konfidensialitet 
Problem statement 
““What tools are used for investment decisions and how does decision makers make sense of 
investment during uncertainty?” 
Norsk: Hvilke verktøy brukes for investeringsbeslutninger og hvordan beslutningstakere 
“skaper mening” til sine beslutninger. 
 
Og i forbindelse med det.. 
Tema/spørsmål  
 
1. Hvordan måler ledelsen i oljeselskaper risiko og usikkerhet i prosjekter, og hvordan 
blir disse faktorene beregnet for i investeringsbeslutninger? 
 
2. Hvilket andre faktorer er det som påvirker beslutninger, ut over tradisjonell Finansielle 
analyser? 
 - Vi	vet	allerede	at	«hard	data	brukes	i	investeringsbeslutninger.	Dette	har	vi	allerede	
god	kjennskap	til.	Men	jeg	synes	det	er	spennende	å	vite	hva	annet	som	påvirker	en	
beslutning,	fremfor	tall.	Kan	det	være	leders	erfaringer?	kan	det	være	tidligere	
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erfaringer	i	markedet?	eller	erfaringer	i	lignende	prosjekter?	Historiske	hendelser	i	
markedet,	i	lignende	prosjekter?	- Hva med politisk, reguleringer, skattelover osv.. 
 
 
3. Prissjokk, og dets påvirkning investeringer-> Hvordan prissjokk begrenser 
beslutningsmodeller ved investering. 
 - Jeg	vil	gjerne	finne	ut	hvordan	dagens	prissjokk	begrenser	beslutningsmodeller	ved	
investeringer.	Siden	beslutninger	må	tas	raskt,	kan	det	kanskje	være	en	begrensning	
med	å	hente	inn	all	data	og	tall	og	kanskje	disse	typer	tall	blir	for	magert	under	
prissjokk.	Tar	man	i	betraktning	historisk	erfaring.?	Hva	skjedde	ved	tidligere	prisfall?,	
lærte	man	noe	da	som	man	tar	i	betraktning	i	dag?	Da	blir	eventuelt		dagens	
beslutninger	tatt	ut	fra	tidligere	erfaringer,	fremfor	analytiske	metoder.		- Hva når beslutninger skal/må tas raskt? 
 
 
4. Hvordan beslutninger for Statoil skiller seg mellom investering i Norge og I utlandet? 
 
Selv om et marked I utlandet er mer lønnsomt enn et norsk prosjekt, satser man 
kanskje hjemme. Dette for at Statoil har forpliktelser og dermed press på seg til å et 
samfunnsansvar hjemme.   - Hva	med	Statoil	investeringer?.	Disse	har	fått	mye	kritikk	i	media,	og	de	har	tapt	
masse	penger	på	disse	beslutningene.		
 
 
 
